

















Economic growth in Latin 
America and the Caribbean: 


















Economic Development Division 
 
  S
   
 E
   
 R
   
 I
   
 E
 
macroeconomía del desarrollo 
58 
Santiago, Chile, August 2007
This document was prepared by Mario A. Gutiérrez, Ph.D economics 
University of Chicago, Research Commissioned by the Economic Commission 
for Latina America and the Caribbean (ECLAC/CEPAL). I appreciate the 
comments received from Andrés Solimano, Regional Advisor CEPAL, J-E 
Carlotti, Professor,l Paris 11, Paris, France, J.M. Ramírez, Banco de la 
República, Colombia, Mauricio de la Cuba, Banco Central de Perú and experts 
invited to the CEPAL Workshop in Santiago, Chile, June 2007. I am also very 
grateful to Diego Avanzini, Doctoral student, Pontificia Universidad Católica de 
Chile, for his excellent research assistant. 
The views expressed in this document, which has been reproduced without 














United Nations Publication 
ISSN printed version 1680-8843 




Sales No.: E.07.II.G.117 
Copyright © United Nations, September 2007. All rights reserved 
Printed in United Nations, Santiago, Chile 
 
Applications for the right to reproduce this work are welcomed and should be sent to the 
Secretary of the Publications Board, United Nations Headquarters, New York, N.Y. 
10017, U.S.A. Member States and their governmental institutions may reproduce this 
work without prior authorization, but are requested to mention the source and inform the 
United Nations of such reproduction. 
 




I. Introduction ................................................................................7 
II. Growth transitions: background ...........................................9 
III. Methodological approach .....................................................11 
 1. Growth transitions: accelerations, decelerations and stable 
periods ..................................................................................12 
 2. Granger causality..................................................................13 
 3. Measured probabilities .........................................................13 
IV. Growth transitions, investment and saving in Latin 
America (1960-2005) ...............................................................15 
 1. Growth trends and general patterns ......................................16 
 2. Characteristics of growth transitions ....................................16 
V. Final remarks and policy issues .........................................25 
Bibliography .....................................................................................29 
Appendix ......................................................................................31 




CEPAL - SERIE Macroeconomía del desarrollo N° 58 
5 
Abstract 
Recent evidence on economic growth indicates that growth fluctuations at 
frequencies of a decade or so are at the centre of the Latin American countries’ 
growth story. In this context, investment has played an important role as a 
source of growth, while national saving has been the main source of 
investment financing. Foreign saving has played a secondary role and has 
generally been substituted for national saving, rather than augmenting the total 
amount of savings available in Latin America. The high volatility and 
vulnerability to external swings exhibited by foreign capital have made 
foreign saving an unstable source of investment financing. This study on Latin 
America helps to provide a statistical framework for analysing the growth 
story of Latin America. Transitions affecting per capita GDP growth, 
investment and national and foreign savings rates are identified, as are 
common and country-specific transitions, based on comparisons of a sample 
group of eight Latin American countries with the Latin American and 
Caribbean region as a whole for the period 1960-2005. 
This research also helps to demonstrate that some growth episodes are 
not well captured by standard growth theories and econometric work 
developed and based on different economic contexts and time periods. The 
study confirms some general conclusions reached in the literature but provides 
evidence that raises doubts about others. Although growth needs to be 
sustained by higher investment rates, an initial impulse from investment is not 
required in order for growth to accelerate. It is not always the case that growth 
accelerations are accompanied by rising national savings rates; the latter may 
also decline. Foreign saving does not, in most cases, add to total saving (equal 
to investment), and the crowding out of national saving by foreign saving 
seems to be positively biased (being stronger when foreign saving is rising). 
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I. Introduction 
Recent evidence on economic growth indicates that growth 
fluctuations at frequencies of a decade or so are at the centre of the 
Latin American countries’ growth story. Growth in Latin America in 
particular and in developing countries in general is an irregular and 
highly volatile process in which a given country may experience 
several different growth transitions or growth spells (accelerations and 
decelerations). Steady growth around a well-defined, stable trend is 
clearly not a good description of the actual growth experience of Latin 
American countries. In this context, investment has played an 
important role as a source of growth, while national saving has been 
the main source of investment financing. Foreign saving has played a 
secondary role and has generally been substituted for national saving, 
rather than augmenting the total amount of savings available in Latin 
America. The high volatility and vulnerability to external swings 
exhibited by foreign capital have made foreign saving an unstable 
source of investment financing. 
This study on Latin America helps to provide a statistical 
framework for analysing the growth story of Latin America, which is a 
story of frequent growth transitions rather than steady growth around a 
long-run trend. The focus here is on growth transitions and on the role 
played by investment and by national and foreign saving during 
growth transitions. Transitions affecting investment and national and 
foreign savings rates are identified, as are common and country-
specific transitions, based on comparisons of a sample group of eight 
Latin American countries with the Latin American and Caribbean 
region as a whole for the period 1960-2005. The Hodrick-Prescott 
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(HP) filter was used to identify acceleration, deceleration and stable episodes for four data series 
and for each of the selected countries and the entire Latin American and Caribbean region.  
Growth transitions in the region were compared with transitions in the United States, in 15 
high-income countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and in the East Asia and Pacific region. The United States, as the largest single developed economy, 
has historically had the closest economic links with Latin America and the Caribbean, while the 
richer OECD countries have also maintained important trade and financial ties with the Latin 
America and the Caribbean region. The East Asia and Pacific region, in turn, has become a standard 
of reference for Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of economic growth and development.  
Measured probabilities were derived for leads and lags in investment, national saving and 
foreign saving in terms of growth transitions, leads and lags in national and foreign saving in terms 
of investment, and leads and lags in foreign saving in terms of national saving. Measured 
probabilities for common and country-specific transitions (before and after the 1990s) were also 
derived. Granger causality tests were applied to all the various pairwise combinations for the series 
of per capita GDP growth, investment rates, national savings rates and foreign savings rates for the 
Latin American and Caribbean region in the aggregate and for the eight individual countries making 
up the sample used for this study. 
This research also helps to demonstrate that some growth episodes are not well captured by 
standard growth theories and econometric work developed and based on different economic 
contexts and time periods.1 Key observations are provided about growth transitions and the 
differential behaviour of investment, national saving and foreign saving during growth transitions in 
Latin America. The study confirms some general conclusions reached in the literature but provides 
evidence that raises doubts about others. 
                                                     
1  For further discussion of the foundations for the case approach to economic growth and to economic policy in general, see Easterly 
(2001 and 2006) and Stiglitz (2003 and 2006).  
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II. Growth transitions: background 
Empirical work on economic growth has been strongly 
influenced by the Solow supply-driven model (1950s), which was 
developed to explain growth in the United States in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Under this model, the long-run (steady-state) growth 
of per capita income is determined by the rate of technological change. 
Subsequent econometric analysis based on large panels of data across 
time and countries (Barro, 1991) and the endogenous growth models 
developed since the mid-1980s (Lucas, 1988; and Romer, 1986) assign 
a crucial role to investment in explaining long-run growth as a vehicle 
for technological progress.  
The recent literature on economic growth has gone beyond 
standard theories and econometric approaches to focus on 
understanding growth transitions and case-by-case differences in 
growth experiences. This work has gained momentum amid the 
disappointing experiences of some Latin American countries that have 
followed macroeconomic policy advice that draws heavily on 
generalizations and simplifications of standard theories and 
econometric results (see Easterly, 2001 and 2006; Rodrik, 2005b; and 
Stiglitz, 2003 and 2006).  
The empirical relevance of growth transitions is highlighted by 
the fact that a typical developing country tends to shift between 
different growth regimes over time rather than growing steadily around 
a stable trend, which is more typical of developed economies. Growth 
in Latin America is characterized by high volatility and a low 
correlation between current and past growth rates (low time 
persistence) (see Hakura, 2007; Sahay and Goyal, 2006; and Solimano 
and Gutiérrez, 2006). 
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The literature on growth transitions has sought to explain how some key economic policies 
and structures may influence the duration of growth spells (Berg, Ostry and Zettelmeyer, 2006). 
Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2004), who examine the relationship between growth acceleration 
episodes and key binding constraints affecting economic growth, argue 2004) have proposed a 
framework for identifying key binding constraints related to investment and saving that that growth 
accelerations are fairly frequent events. Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (affect economic growth. 
They contend that an understanding of these differences can contribute to a more effective 
formulation of pro-growth policy priorities (see also Rodrik, 2004 and 2005a). In this context, 
investment, saving and growth will be stimulated as new opportunities open up. 
This research is in line with the recent literature focusing on growth transitions. Such 
transitions (including growth accelerations, growth decelerations and episodes of stable growth 
rates) are examined in terms of their relationships with investment, national saving and foreign 
saving, as well as co-movements in common and country-specific transitions. 
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III. Methodological approach 
The study is based on data on per capita GDP growth, investment and 
national and foreign savings rates for eight selected countries: 
Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru. The sample contains large, medium-
sized and small economies that are representative of the diversity 
found in Latin America. The selection of countries took into account 
the availability and reliability of data on growth, investment and 
saving.  
Data were compiled for four series corresponding to the entire 
Latin American and the Caribbean region for purposes of comparison 
with the selected countries. Data on per capita GDP growth for the 
United States, 15 high-income OECD economies, and the East Asia 
and Pacific region were used to compare these countries’ and 
groupings’ trends and co-movements with those of Latin America and 
the Caribbean. The World Development Indicators (WDI) database of 
the World Bank and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were used for these 
purposes. 
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1. Growth transitions: accelerations, decelerations 
and stable periods 
To identify growth accelerations and decelerations, the series on per capita GDP growth, investment 
rates, and national and foreign savings rates were run through the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter.2 
The HP filter is a method for obtaining a smooth estimate of the long-term trend component of a 
series. This two-sided linear filter computes the smoothed series mt of a given series yt by 
minimizing the variance of yt around mt, subject to a penalty that constrains the second difference 

















2 )()()( λ  
 
where the penalty parameter λ controls the smoothness of the series mt: the larger the λ, the 
smoother the mt. When λ→∞, mt approaches a linear trend. Hodrick and Prescott (1997) suggested 
the use of λ = 100 for annual data (cycles of about 20 years for smoothing) as it provides a better fit 
with the growth story of the United States economy. Given the higher degree of volatility observed 
in the growth series for Latin America, in this case a λ of 7 (cycles of about 10 years for smoothing) 
was felt to be the most appropriate choice for reflecting the growth pattern of Latin American 
countries (see Maravall and del Río, 2001).  
The HP filter was applied to the original series. For the per capita GDP series, however, the 
HP filter was first used on the original series in level terms, i.e., the per capita GDP (in constant 
2000 dollars) series, and the HP-filtered per capita GDP growth rate was then derived from the 
results. Moving averages calculated over 3- and 5-year periods were also tried, with differenced 
moving averages being obtained from the differentials between the original and lagged moving 
average series (using various lags). These alternatives were discarded, however, as the derived 
series were highly volatile, were contaminated by lagged data and, as a result, provided 
questionable information about the starting and ending years of the various growth spells. 
The study distinguishes three types of transitions: acceleration, deceleration and stable 
episodes. Accelerations (decelerations) are defined as episodes in which the HP-filtered series 
displays a persistently increasing (decreasing) trend for at least three years. When the HP-filtered 
series exhibits consecutive years of mixed trends, the periods are identified as stable episodes. In 
other words, a stable episode is a period in which the series exhibits no clear trend.  
Common acceleration, deceleration and stable periods for per capita GDP growth, 
investment, national saving and foreign saving were identified for each of the eight countries in the 
sample and for the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole. For purposes of comparison 
with Latin America and the Caribbean, growth transitions and common growth transitions were 
calculated for the United States, 15 high-income OECD countries and the East Asia and Pacific 
region. All the results are reported in appendix A. 
                                                     
2  This method was first used in a working paper (circulated in the early 1980s and published in 1997) in which Hodrick and Prescott 
analysed postwar business cycles in the United States (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). 
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2. Granger causality 
The Granger causality test examines the degree of significance in the statistical order of precedence 
between two time series. Thus, the test does not reveal a “causal” relation in a strict sense, but rather 
signals “causality” by determining that order of precedence. Saying that series x “Granger-causes” 
series y signifies that y’s behaviour can be explained in part by x’s lags.3  
















The reported F-statistics are the Wald statistics for each equation for the joint hypothesis 
0...21 ==== kβββ . The pairwise Granger causality test examines causality for both equations 
and therefore tests causality in both directions. Whenever the test is significant at the 1%, 5% or 
10% level, then the null hypothesis is rejected and the existence of “Granger causality” is accepted. 
A suite of Granger tests consisting of all pairwise combinations of per capita GDP growth, 
investment (proxied by total gross capital formation rates), national saving and foreign saving series 
for the Latin American and Caribbean region and for the eight countries in the sample were 
performed. Granger tests were applied to the HP-filtered series using three lags to extract more 
rigorous statistical conclusions regarding the relationships existing among the four variables 
examined for the entire story of growth transitions in 1960-2004.4 All the results are reported in 
appendix A. 
3. Measured probabilities 
Two sets of measured probabilities were generated using the database on growth transitions 
compiled for this study. The first set measures the probabilities that investment, national savings 
and foreign savings rates lead or lag per capita GDP growth; that national or foreign saving lead or 
lag investment; and that foreign saving leads or lags national saving. The second set provides an 
estimate of the probability of common growth transitions. These measures help to gauge, for 
example, the probability of a growth transition being led or lagged by an acceleration of investment 
and the probability of a growth deceleration being the result of a common deceleration (i.e., one 
affecting all Latin American and Caribbean countries). All the results are reported in appendix A. 
                                                     
3  Granger-causality between two series is found to exist when the test provides statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis. The 
null hypothesis in the Granger test is that “x does not Granger-cause y”. When statistical evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis is 
present, it means that “x Granger-causes y”. 
4  Pairwise Granger causality tests were applied to original series and HP-filtered series using 3, 5, 8, and 10 lags. These results are not 
reported because they do not add any further insights to the reported conclusions. 
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IV. Growth transitions, investment 
and saving in Latin America 
(1960-2005) 
The literature on economic growth assigns key roles to investment and 
saving as the main factors driving economic growth, especially during 
growth transitions. In the Solow model, the savings rate is exogenous 
and equal to actual investment. Savings and investment rates play a 
role only in the transitions between steady states, but not in the 
determination of long-run growth. The model predicts that high- and 
low-saving/investment economies experiencing the same extent of 
technological progress will not differ in their long-run per capita 
growth rates, but this conclusion is contradicted by most of the 
empirical evidence. The evidence has also confirmed the important 
role of investment as a key contributing factor to growth in the long 
run and during growth transitions (Barro, 1991; Lucas, 1988; Romer, 
1986; and Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, 2004). Saving is the 
financing counterpart of investment, and the evidence points to a high 
correlation between national saving and growth (Feldstein and 
Horioka, 1980; and Bordo and Flandreau, 2003).5 
                                                     
5  The breakdown of investment between the public and private sectors and between machinery and construction has a bearing on 
growth, but the breakdown of saving between the public and private sectors also matters (Solimano and Gutiérrez, 2006). 
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1. Growth trends and general patterns 
The 1960-2005 period exhibits a slight downward trend in growth for Latin America and the 
Caribbean starting in the early 1960s, a pronounced deceleration during the 1970s and early 1980s, 
a less pronounced acceleration from the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s, and no clear trend after the 
mid-1990s (see figure A.1). A different long-term pattern is observed in East Asia and the Pacific 
(see figure A.2), which experienced a continuous upward long-term growth trend during the entire 
period. The United States exhibits a slight decline in long-term per capita growth, but it is less 
pronounced than the downtrend seen in Latin America and the Caribbean. The 15 high-income 
OECD countries used in this study displayed a declining long-run trend which became somewhat 
flatter after the 1980s. 
Of the eight selected Latin American countries, Chile is the only one that exhibits an upward 
long-run trend in per capita GDP growth. The other seven countries show either a nearly flat or a 
slightly declining long-run trend. Although the frequency of growth transitions (growth spells) is 
not higher for the Latin American and Caribbean region or for most of the selected countries than it 
is for the United States or for East Asia and the Pacific, their transitions’ amplitude and duration are 
much greater. (see figure B.3.1)  
The results for all the growth transitions (both positive and negative growth spells) indicate 
that growth leads investment in about 56% of all growth accelerations and 43% of all growth 
decelerations. National saving and growth are about equally distributed in terms of leads and lags. 
Foreign saving lags growth in about 33% of growth accelerations and 57% of growth decelerations. 
The results also show that national saving leads investment in about 44% of investment 
accelerations and 26% of investment decelerations. Foreign saving also leads national saving in 
about 42% of national saving accelerations and 43% of decelerations (see table A.5). 
More than 60% of the total years encompassed by accelerations and decelerations of per 
capita GDP growth and investment rates experienced by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica 
and Peru also occurred at the regional level. This implies that the majority of these growth 
transitions resulted either from forces generated outside the Latin American and Caribbean region 
or from the influence of large countries within the region (intraregional contagion effects). 
Countries that have been more isolated or “protected” from contagion include Chile (50% of growth 
acceleration years in common with the region as a whole), Mexico (25% of growth acceleration 
years and 35% of growth deceleration years in common) and Peru (50% of growth deceleration 
years in common) (see figures B.1.4, B.2.4, B.3.4, B.4.4, B.5.4, B.6.4 and B.7.4)  
The results thus suggest that the majority of growth and investment transitions in Latin 
America have been “common” in the sense that they match up with transitions at the aggregate 
regional level. National saving and, to a lesser extent, foreign saving, in contrast, have mainly been 
country-specific. The national savings rate has moved more independently across countries, 
especially during periods of deceleration in national savings rates. The results also trace out a 
general pattern of substitution of foreign saving for national saving. 
2. Characteristics of growth transitions 
(a) Frequency  
(i) Latin America’s growth story is one of frequent and large fluctuations in growth regimes, 
and the region’s growth transition episodes have increased in frequency since the 1980s. This 
observation holds for the region as a whole as well as for most of the individual countries in the 
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sample. Growth accelerations or decelerations have dominated the region’s growth story in 1960-
2005, with very few stable periods being observed (see table A.1). 
(ii) Stable growth episodes are rather infrequent events not only in Latin America and the 
Caribbean but also in the United States, OECD and the East Asia and Pacific region. Colombia is an 
exception to the rule, as it has witnessed three stable episodes (the longest being from 1989 to 
1994), compared to just one or none for other Latin American countries. 
(iii) The frequency of growth accelerations and decelerations is illustrated by the fact that 
the Latin American and Caribbean region, taken as a whole, experienced a total of eight growth 
transitions in 1960-2005: four accelerations, two decelerations and two stable periods. Of the eight 
observed growth transitions, five took place in 1980-2005 (three accelerations, one deceleration and 
one stable episode). 
(iv) The story is similar at the level of individual countries. Growth transitions (mostly 
either accelerations or decelerations) have been concentrated in the years after the 1970s, with the 
most frequent number of growth transitions during this subperiod being observed in Brazil (6), 
Mexico (6) and Peru (6). The lowest frequencies are observed in Chile (4) and Venezuela (3), 
although the transitions in the latter were of a much longer amplitude than those of Chile.  
(b) Amplitude  
(i) The amplitudes of growth accelerations and decelerations (distance between peaks and 
troughs, comparing growth rates in the first and last years of a growth transition or spell) in Latin 
America and the Caribbean are much longer than they are in the United States or East Asia and the 
Pacific, while the latter region exhibits shorter amplitudes than does the United States. The 
amplitudes of growth transitions have increased in the United States since the 1980s and in East 
Asia and the Pacific since the 1990s, however.  
(ii) Amplitudes in Latin America and the Caribbean have remained long since the 1980s. 
Although they have declined slightly for the Latin American and Caribbean region in the aggregate, 
longer amplitudes have been found for Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, 
Mexico and Peru.  
(iii) The longest growth transition amplitudes for the region as a whole are observed in the 
1972-1983 deceleration spell (from +3.8% to -1.8%) and the 1984-1994 acceleration spell (from -
1.8% to +1.8), which was briefly interrupted by a stable period in 1987-1989.  
(iv) An extended period of growth acceleration during the 1960s was led by Brazil (Brazil’s 
golden age of industrialization). Growth accelerations were also observed in the 1960s, though less 
pronounced, in Argentina, Colombia and Costa Rica. That decade marked the most dynamic period 
in the import-substitution industrialization model adopted after the Second World War, in which 
national output was heavily protected from import competition.  
(v) An extended period of growth deceleration was observed starting in the 1970s that 
lasted until about the mid-1980s for the region as a whole. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
and Mexico managed to escape this general trend, however. Mexico’s growth accelerated during the 
first and second oil shocks of the early and late 1970s, however, whereas Venezuela’s growth 
accelerated only during the first oil shock.  
The 1970s marked the death throes of the industrialization model, which came to an end with 
the 1980s debt crisis. The 1970s was also a decade that saw two oil shocks (1973-1974 and 1979-
1980) and two major hikes in external interest rates (1973-1974 and 1978-1981). In addition, the 
United States experienced growth decelerations in the early 1970 and late 1980s that had negative 
contagion effects on Latin America and the Caribbean. The early 1980s was a time of external debt 
defaults across the region, debt restructurings, and balance-of-payments and fiscal adjustments.  
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(vi) From the mid-1980s until roughly the mid-1990s, an extended period of growth 
acceleration was seen in the region (interrupted, as noted earlier, by a brief stable period in 1987-
1989) amid economic reforms and benign external conditions (falling external interest rates, a 
recovery of primary commodity prices and massive inflows of foreign capital and foreign direct 
investment). Growth accelerations were led by Chile, followed by the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Colombia and Costa Rica. Argentina’s, Brazil’s and Peru’s growth accelerated in the 
late 1980s, while Mexico’s did not until the second half of the 1990s.  
(vii) From 1994 to 2001 the region exhibited a period of growth deceleration followed by a 
growth acceleration after 2002. The growth rates posted by the region as a whole after the 1980s 
have never reached or surpassed the peak rate recorded in the early 1970s (3.8% at its height in 
1971). Since the 1990s, the region has proven to be vulnerable to a series of external contagion 
shocks of a type not seen in the 1960s or 1970s as a consequence of financial-sector reforms and 
capital-account liberalizations that heighten the contagion effect of foreign events.  
(viii) At the level of individual countries, the longest growth acceleration/deceleration cycles 
have been observed in: (1) Argentina, which experienced a deceleration from 1969 to 1982 (from 
+3.6 to -2%) that was briefly interrupted by a stable period in 1977-1979 and an acceleration in 
1989-1993 (from -1.7% to +4.6%), as well as a deceleration in 1994-2001 (from +4.6% to -2.6%); 
(2) Brazil, which underwent an acceleration in 1965-1972 (from +0.6 to +8.6%) and a deceleration 
in 1973-1982 (from +8.6% to -0.8%); (3) Chile, which witnessed an acceleration in 1974-1978 
(from -2.5 to +3.7%), an acceleration in 1983-1992 (from -06% to +6.7%), and a deceleration in 
1993-2000 (from +6.7% to +1.7%); Colombia, which recorded a deceleration in 1972-1982 (from 
+3.9% to +0.4%) that was briefly interrupted by a stable period in 1976-1978, and a deceleration in 
1988-1999 (from +2.4% to -1%), which was broken by a stable episode involving a slight declining 
trend in 1989-1994; Costa Rica, which registered a deceleration in 1972-1982 (from +4.5% to -
2.8%) and an acceleration in 1983-1992 (from -2.8% to +3%); Mexico, which experienced a 
deceleration in 1980-1985 (from +4.5% to -1.6%); Peru, which witnessed a deceleration in 1990-
1995 (from -5.4% to 4.2%); and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, whose economic 
deceleration in 1976-1982 (from +0.8% to -4.5%) was followed by an acceleration in 1983-1991 
(from -4.5% to +1.6%) and then a fresh deceleration in 1992-2001 (from +1.6% to -2.5). 
(c) Duration 
(i) Growth spells have been longer in Latin America and the Caribbean than in the United 
States, OECD or East Asia and the Pacific. The longest growth spells for the region as a whole were 
observed in 1964-1971 (a 7-year acceleration), 1972-1983 (an 11-year deceleration) and 1995-2001 
(a 6-year deceleration).  
(ii) The longest growth spells have occurred in Costa Rica (a 10-year deceleration in 1972-
1982), Brazil (a 9-year deceleration in 1973-1982), Chile (a 9-year acceleration in 1983-1992) and 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (a 6-year deceleration in 1976-1982). However, if brief 
periods of growth rate stability are discounted, then the longest decelerations have occurred in Peru 
from 1962 to 1989 (27 years), the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela from 1962-1982 (20 years) and 
Argentina from 1968 to 1982 (14 years).  
(d) Common and country-specific growth transitions  
(i) A comparison of growth spells for each of the eight countries in the sample and for the 
Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole points up several common accelerations, 
decelerations and stable periods in 1960-2005. These data constitute evidence of common events in 
the entire region, but they also illustrate contagion effects in some of the larger countries. Country-
specific growth transitions not found in the region as a whole have been longer in the case of 
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Mexico (growth accelerations, decelerations or stable periods). In all of the other seven countries in 
the sample, growth transitions in 1960-2005 have mainly been associated with common episodes 
(more than 50% of individual-country growth transitions have coincided with such episodes at the 
regionwide level).  
(ii) Common acceleration and deceleration episodes in terms of national and foreign 
savings rates have been quite frequent in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia, with 
correlations of more than 60% with the region as a whole in most cases. Common episodes have 
been less frequent for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru 
(correlations below 50% in most cases). The correlations for national saving are also lower during 
decelerations than during accelerations of the national saving rate.  
(iii) The increase in the probability of common growth transitions observed after the 1990s 
(except in the case of Colombia) is an indication of heightened interdependence during this new 
wave of globalization.6 The frequency of common foreign savings accelerations rose after the 1990s 
for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Common foreign saving decelerations increased 
after the 1990s for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia and Peru (for different 
views on this issue, see Aiolfi, Catao and Timmermann, 2006; Hakura, 2007; Prasad, Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2006; and Rana and Goyal, 2006).  
(iv) About half of all the relevant growth transitions are common to Latin America and the 
United States, which is an indication of the strong influence that the United States economy has had 
on the region, although important exceptions are to be observed in the second halves of the 1960s 
and 1980s. In both of these periods, the United States exhibited growth decelerations while Latin 
America and the Caribbean were experiencing accelerations (mainly as a consequence of Brazil’s 
performance in the first of these periods and of the results achieved by most Latin American 
countries (except Peru) during the second as they pursued stabilization efforts and succeeded in 
making a partial recovery from the early 1980s debt crisis (see also Aiolfi, Catao and Timmermann, 
2006; and Hakura, 2007). 
(e) Investment and growth 
The role played by investment in growth transitions is bound to be influential, since it is of 
critical importance as a vehicle for the creation of productive capacities, knowledge spillovers and 
new technologies. A reform process can also trigger short-term productivity gains that lead to faster 
initial growth in economies that are starting from high, distorted levels (Solimano and Gutiérrez, 
2006). The composition of investment (in terms of machinery and equipment/construction and 
private/public investment) has an impact on growth (Solimano and Gutierrez, 2006). In part, this is 
because the “irreversible” character of physical-investment decisions implies that there is a high 
“value of waiting” in investment decisions (Servén and Solimano, 1993). Hausmann, Pritchett and 
Rodrik (2004) also provide evidence that growth accelerations have been accompanied by an 
increase in investment. 
The crucial importance of investment during growth transitions is confirmed by the evidence 
gathered for this study, as most growth transitions have been, at some point, supported by 
accelerated investment (higher investment rates). In most cases, growth accelerates or decelerates 
before investment, as growth leads investment in about 56% of all growth accelerations and 43% of 
all decelerations. Growth can accelerate before investment when unutilized capacity is available, 
which seems to be the general case in Latin America and the Caribbean. This situation also reflects 
the fact that growth accelerations often follow upon a deceleration. 
                                                     
6  During the second half of the 1880s and until the First World War, the world economy experienced a first wave of globalization. In 
today’s global capital markets, however, capital flows and foreign investment aim for risk sharing and diversification instead of long-
term financing to build infrastructure and housing, as was the case in the pre-1914 world (Solimano and Gutiérrez, 2006). 
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Although growth needs to be sustained by higher investment rates, an initial impulse from 
investment is not required in order for growth to accelerate. Growth accelerations can be preceded 
by falling or stable investment rates, and not all investment accelerations are accompanied or 
followed by growth accelerations. Growth may also decelerate while the investment rate is rising. 
Investment in construction and public investment have proven to be less effective in promoting 
growth in Latin America than elsewhere (see Gutiérrez 2005; and Solimano and Gutiérrez, 2006). 
There have also been several growth accelerations that have been accompanied by 
accelerations of investment rates which extend beyond the end of the relevant growth acceleration 
episode, as well as several growth decelerations that have been accompanied by decelerations of 
investment rates which also have extended beyond the end of the corresponding growth 
deceleration. This is valid for the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole and for several 
episodes in the selected countries. The “irreversibility” of investment helps to underpin this 
observation. In such cases, investment reacts after accelerated growth episodes have led to full (or 
nearly full) utilization of installed capacity, which in many cases takes between three and four 
years. When growth decelerates, investment also decelerates but with a lag, and the physical capital 
capacity that was built during the investment acceleration, if not destroyed, becomes available for 
the next round of growth acceleration. 
A number of other cases of co-movements between investment and growth were also 
observed, however. These episodes suggest that investment is required but does not guarantee 
higher growth and that growth can accelerate even without an initial impulse from higher 
investment. These observations include the following: (i) growth accelerations preceded by an 
acceleration of investment rates (Latin America and the Caribbean, 1990-1994; the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, 1972-1975 and 1988-1991; Chile, 1975-1979; Colombia, 1966-1971; and 
Mexico, 1961-1964, 1976-1979); (ii) growth accelerations preceded by stable or decelerating 
investment rates (Latin America 1964-1971, 1984-1986 and 2002-1005; Argentina 1961-1965, 
1989-1993 and 2002-2005; Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1983-1991 and 2002-2005; Brazil, 
1965-1972, 1983-1986, 1991-1995 and 2003-2005; Chile, 1983-1992 and 2001-2005; Colombia, 
1984-1988 and 2000-2005; Costa Rica, 1961-1971; Mexico, 1986-1991 and 1995-1998; and Peru, 
1969-1973, 1990-1995 and 2001-2005); (iii) accelerations of investment rates followed by 
decelerations of growth (Colombia, 1977-1982 and 1991-1999); (iv) prolonged accelerations of 
investment rates accompanied by growth decelerations (the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
1960-1971 and 1992-2001; Costa Rica, 1972-1981; Mexico 1960-1970; and Peru, 1973-1981); (v) 
growth and investment rates that accelerate or decelerate simultaneously (Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 1964-1971; Chile 1968-1972); (vi) protracted growth decelerations accompanied by 
accelerations of investment rates (Argentina, 1970-1977 and 1994-1996); and (vii) long stable 
periods accompanied by an acceleration of investment rates (Chile, 1961-1967).  
The HP-filtered Granger test results show causality in both directions between investment 
and growth for the Latin American and Caribbean region in the aggregate (at 1% significance, see 
table A.4). This suggests a mutual reinforcement between growth and investment; in some cases, 
lifting constraints on investment may trigger a more rapid pace of growth while, in other cases, an 
acceleration of growth may improve investment sentiment (and expected returns) and encourage 
additional investments (for more on this subject, see Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, 2004; and 
Gutiérrez, 2005). The possibility of mutual causality is confirmed by the diversity observed in the 
individual countries’ results. In the cases of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile and 
Peru, the results are similar to those obtained for the region in the aggregate, as causality in both 
directions was highly significant in most cases (at the 1% level). For Argentina, growth caused 
investment; for Costa Rica, investment caused growth; for Colombia and Mexico, the results 
showed no direct causality in either direction. The results also suggest that growth can accelerate 
without an initial investment impulse and that the composition and quality of investment has an 
impact in terms of growth (see Gutierrez, 2005; and Solimano and Gutierrez, 2006).  
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(f) National saving and growth 
Theories and evidence about the links between saving and current growth have been founded 
upon the permanent income hypothesis of Milton Friedman and the life-cycle model of Franco 
Modigliani. The former states that consumption is determined by permanent (long-run) income, 
implying that saving follows current (transitory) growth. The latter argues that productivity growth 
makes the working young population richer than the old, with the young saving more than the old 
are dissaving. It also implies that aggregate income growth would follow from an increase in the 
lifetime profiles of succeeding generations.7 In the Keynesian school of thought, saving is 
endogenously determined by interactions between income and consumption. Higher current growth 
generates higher incomes, which lead, in turn, to higher saving (as the propensity to consume out of 
income is less than one). Carroll and Weil (1994) argue that habit formation in consumption is a 
factor that helps to rationalize the positive correlation between saving and current growth. They also 
provide evidence that growth Granger-causes saving, although this finding has been questioned by 
some authors (Attanasio, Picci and Scorcu, 2000; Gutierrez, 2007).  
The evidence on growth transitions gathered in this study (see tables in appendix A, figure 
A.1 and figures B includes information on several cases in which growth accelerations and 
decelerations have, at some point, been accompanied or followed by accelerations in national 
savings rates. This evidence thus corroborates the findings presented in the literature about the 
relationship between these two variables, with growth driving up national saving or higher national 
saving helping to finance higher investment and higher growth.  
Growth does not necessarily generate higher national saving, however. Growth accelerations 
may be consumption-oriented. If this is the case, they will be reflected in a rising current-account 
deficit financed by foreign capital flows (foreign savings). In such a case, foreign saving would then 
substitute for national saving, and growth would be coupled with falling national savings rates. The 
results obtained in this study for all growth transitions (positive and negative growth spells) show that 
national saving and growth are about equally distributed in terms of leads and lags (see table A.5). 
Several cases have also been observed, however, that suggest that growth may accelerate 
(decelerate) without an increase (decrease) in national savings rates and that higher (lower) national 
savings rates do not necessarily translate into an acceleration (deceleration) of growth. For policy 
purposes, these cases suggest that some growth transitions may be primarily oriented towards 
consumption (reducing national saving) and that, in such cases, national savings policies may not 
necessarily translate into higher growth. Examples of this combination of circumstances include: (i) 
stable national savings rates over a lengthy period of time, coupled with growth accelerations and 
decelerations (Latin America in 1989-2000 and Mexico in 1980-1984); (ii) a long-standing 
deceleration of national savings rates combined with a mixture of growth stability, acceleration and 
deceleration (Argentina in 1976-1999); (iii) a growth deceleration in conjunction with an 
acceleration of national saving (Latin America in 1972-1976, Colombia in 1972-1975, Costa Rica 
in 2000-2003 and Peru in 1996-1999); and (iv) growth accelerations accompanied by decelerations 
in national savings rates (Brazil in 1991-1995, Chile in 1977-1979, Costa Rica in 1988-1992 and 
Mexico in 1986-1991). 
The HP-filtered Granger results show mutual causality between national saving and growth 
for the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole (significant at 10%), as was also the case 
for investment and growth. This indicates that, generally speaking, growth and national saving “go 
together” (as do growth and investment), although this is not always the case These mutually 
reinforcing elements have also been documented in the literature (see, for example, Attanasio, Picci 
                                                     
7  The terms-of-trade effect is viewed as a transitory deviation of national income from its trend. According to Milton Friedman’s 
consumption hypothesis, the additional income resulting from transitory improvements in countries’ terms of trade would mostly be 
saved. In more extensive models of consumer behaviour, the relationship is theoretically ambiguous (Carroll and Weil, 1994).  
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and Scorcu, 2000; Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, 2005; and Gutiérrez, 2007). This finding 
suggests that the removal of restrictions on national saving will stimulate investment and growth, 
but it also indicates that an acceleration of growth will stimulate saving (see also Carroll and Weil, 
2004; Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén 1999; and Solimano and Gutiérrez, 2006). The results for the 
selected countries also suggest that causality may run in both directions, although the pattern is not 
uniform. For Argentina, for example, there is no causality in either direction. For Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica and Peru, however, causality does run in both directions, although it is stronger in the 
case of growth causing national saving (significant at 1%). For the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico, growth Granger-causes national saving.  
(g) Foreign saving and growth 
Although investment has primarily been financed with national saving in Latin America and, 
for that matter, most developing countries, foreign saving (the financing counterpart of the current-
account deficit, most of which is in the form of capital inflows) has, at several points in the region’s 
history, served as an important source of investment financing. Foreign saving has been highly 
volatile, however, and has tended to be a substitute for national saving, thereby fuelling 
consumption booms and current-account crises. The evidence on the association between growth 
and foreign saving is mixed. There are cases of high growth with relatively low foreign savings 
rates (East Asian economies) as well as cases of low-growth episodes combined with high foreign 
savings rates (low-income countries in Africa and Latin America that receive sizeable levels of 
foreign aid) (see Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian, 2006; Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén, 1999; 
Solimano and Gutiérrez, 2006; and Gutierrez, 2007). The results for all the growth transitions 
(positive and negative growth spells) show that foreign saving lags behind growth in about 33% of 
growth accelerations and 57% of growth decelerations (see table A.5). 
The results also show that foreign saving and growth display more diverse relationships 
during growth transitions than national saving and growth do. Episodes in which growth 
accelerations (decelerations) are coupled with foreign savings rate accelerations and decelerations 
have been observed for the Latin American and Caribbean region and for individual countries, but 
the presence of several cases in which the results vary considerably points to a more unstable 
relationship between growth and foreign saving. These cases include the following: (i) stable 
foreign savings rates over lengthy periods of time coexisting with growth accelerations and 
decelerations (Latin America in 1967-1977); (ii) rising foreign savings rates combined with growth 
decelerations (Latin America in 1995-1998, Argentina in 1980-1982 and 1995-1997, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela in 1976-1978, Brazil in 1978-1980 and 1996-1999, Chile in 1980-1982, 
Costa Rica in 2000-2003, and Peru in 1981-1983 and 1986-1988); and (iii) decelerations in foreign 
savings rates in conjunction with growth accelerations (Latin America in 2002-2005, Argentina in 
2002-2004, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 1972-1974 and 2002-2004, Brazil in 2003-
2005, Chile in 1983-1990 and 2001-2005, Colombia in 1984-1998 and 2000-2005, Costa Rica in 
1983-1986 and 1990-1992, Mexico in 1995-1997 and Peru in 2001-2005).  
The HP-filtered Granger results for Latin America and the individual countries show the 
presence of mutual causality between foreign savings and growth, suggesting a reinforcing relation 
between the highly observed volatility of capital flows and the high volatility of growth in the 
region (see also Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian, 2006; and Sahay and Goyal, 2006). For Argentina, 
Peru and Mexico, causality runs in both sense. For Brazil, growth Granger-causes foreign saving. 
For Costa Rica, foreign saving Granger-causes growth. For Colombia and the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, the results show no causality in either direction.  
(h) Investment and national saving 
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The literature offers evidence of a relationship not only between investment and growth but 
also between investment and national saving (Bordo and Flandreau, 2003; Feldstein and Horioka, 
1980; and Taylor, 1996 and 1999). The corresponding empirical studies have uncovered a high and 
significant correlation between investment and national saving both in time series and in cross-
country data, which contradicts the predictions of perfect capital mobility theory and provides 
grounds for the claim that “home biases” are to be found in the saving-investment process.  
The evidence on growth transitions compiled in the course of this study shows that, in several 
instances, investment accelerations (decelerations) have been accompanied at some point by 
accelerations (decelerations) in national savings rates, thus corroborating the general evidence of a 
high correlation between these two variables. Accelerations in investment have also been financed 
with rising foreign saving (and shrinking national saving), however, as the substitution of foreign 
saving for national saving can give rise to a mix involving a larger component of foreign saving and 
a smaller one of national saving that makes a higher rate of investment growth possible. The overall 
results show that national saving leads investment in about 44% of all investment accelerations and 
in approximately 26% of investment decelerations.  
Several cases involving varying types of relationships were also identified, however, such as: 
(i) stable national savings rates combined with accelerations in investment rates (Latin America in 
1989-1997, Chile in 1993-1995); (ii) stable national savings rates coupled with falling investment 
rates (Mexico in 1981-1984, Peru in 2000-2002); (iii) higher national savings rates in conjunction 
with falling investment (Latin America in 2001-2003, Argentina in 2000-2002, Brazil in 2000-
2005, Colombia in 1972-1976 and 1984-1990); (iv) falling national savings rates and rising 
investment rates (Argentina in 1991-1996, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 1985-1987, 
Brazil in 1993-1996, Chile in 1977-1979, Colombia in 1978-1982 and 1992-1995, Costa Rica in 
1977-1979, Mexico in 1987-1991); and (v) accelerations in national savings rates in combination 
with stable investment rates (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 2000-2004, Costa Rica in 1982-
1987, Mexico in 2003-2005, Peru in 2003-2005). 
The HP-filtered Granger results show no causality between investment and national saving 
for the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole or for Argentina. Causality in both 
directions was found for Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru. In the case of Colombia, 
causality runs from investment to national saving. This behaviour is, in part, explained by the 
empirical evidence of partial substitution between national and foreign saving, since investment 
accelerations may at some point be financed by foreign saving as a substitute for national saving, 
even though a closer correlation between national saving and investment will eventually emerge. 
(i) Investment and foreign saving 
Although foreign saving, in combination with national saving, does help to finance 
investment, the literature points to the existence of a partial offset between the two types of saving 
owing to the co-movements of these two variables (partial Ricardian equivalence). In other words, 
foreign saving tends to substitute (partially) for national saving (see Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén, 
1999; Solimano and Gutiérrez, 2006; and Gutierrez, 2007). It is therefore to be expected that 
increases in foreign saving will make a partial contribution to the financing of investment. The 
literature does not, however, suggest what basis there might be for causality between foreign saving and 
investment. Accelerations in investment have been financed with rising foreign saving and shrinking 
national saving during periods of booming capital inflows. The overall results also show that foreign 
saving leads national saving in about 28% of investment accelerations and around 33% of investment 
decelerations. 
A wide variety of different types of cases were observed: (i) stable foreign savings rates coupled 
with accelerating investment rates (Latin America in 1987-1997); (ii) falling foreign savings rates 
combined with rising investment rates (Latin America in 1985-1988, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 
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1970-1974 and 1994-1996, Brazil in 1985-1989, Chile in 1984-1990, Colombia in 2002-2005, Mexico in 
1995-1997 and Peru in 1977-1979); (iii) rising foreign savings rates accompanied by falling investment 
rates (Argentina in 1978-1982, Brazil in 1978-1980, Chile in 1980-1982 and Peru in 1982-1988); and (iv) 
falling foreign saving in conjunction with stable investment rates (Costa Rica in 1982-1987 and Mexico in 
2003-2005).  
The HP-filtered Granger results show a diverse array of results which do not support a finding of 
any clear causality between these two variables. In fact, the results show no causality for the Latin America 
and Caribbean region as a whole or for Chile. For Argentina, Colombia and Costa Rica, foreign saving has 
Granger-caused investment. For Brazil and Peru, investment has Granger-caused foreign saving. For 
Mexico and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, causality ran in both directions. 
(j) National and foreign saving 
The body of empirical evidence corroborates the existence of a partial Ricardian offset between 
national and foreign saving (between 50% and 70) (Gutiérrez, 2007; and Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén, 
1999). Thus, a growing current-account deficit would be financed by capital inflows (an increase in foreign 
saving), which help to finance investment but, at the same time, drive down national saving, thereby 
stimulating consumption. Capital inflows could also be driven by a reduction of national saving and/or a 
rise in investment. The overall results show that foreign saving leads national saving in about 42% of 
national saving accelerations and 41% of its decelerations (see figures A.5, B.1.1, B.2.1, B.3.1, B.4.1, 
B.5.1, B.6.1, B.7.1 and B.8.1).  
There have been several cases in which national savings rates have risen or while foreign savings 
rates for the region as a whole have been stable or falling too. The individual countries in the sample, 
however, display a more general pattern of substitution between these two types of saving. Moreover, there 
are only a few cases in which both national and foreign savings rates have risen simultaneously (Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela in 1997-1998, Chile in 1975-1976, Costa Rica in 2000-2004 and Peru in 1980-
1981 and 1992-1995). This evidence suggests that substitutability between national and foreign saving is 
greater in the presence of net capital inflows than net capital outflows. It seems easier to maintain or reduce 
national saving in periods when external foreign credit constraints are more relaxed than to increase 
national saving in periods of tighter external financing conditions (a reduction of foreign saving associated 
with lower growth would, at the same time, depress national saving). This also implies that foreign capital 
has a more damaging effect on investment and growth when it flows out than the positive effects it has on 
investment and growth when it flows in. Thus, the crowding out of national saving by foreign saving 
seems to be biased on the positive side (when foreign saving is rising).  
The HP-filtered Granger results for the entire region and for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
show no causality between national and foreign saving. For Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica, 
causality ran in both directions. For Chile, Mexico and Peru, national saving Granger-caused foreign 
saving. These results indicate that, although there is a general pattern of substitution between national and 
foreign saving, there is no a general pattern of causality or precedence between the two series, suggesting 
that these two variables tend to move simultaneously in opposite directions. 
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V. Final Remarks and policy issues 
The growth story of Latin America has been one of frequent growth 
transitions rather than steady growth around a long-run trend. For the 
purposes of this study, a statistical framework for identifying growth 
transitions was developed, and probabilities of leads and lags related to 
co-movements among per capita GDP growth, investment, and 
national and foreign savings rates were derived. Granger causality tests 
were also applied with a view to arriving at general observations about 
co-movements among the pairwise combinations of the series of GDP 
per capita growth, investment rates, national savings rates and foreign 
savings rates. The period 1960-2005 was surveyed for a sample of 
eight Latin American countries and the Latin American and Caribbean 
region in the aggregate.  
The research conducted for this study helps to shape a statistical 
framework for the examination of growth transitions and to 
demonstrate that several growth episodes in Latin America have not 
been well captured by standard theories or econometric work based on 
various types of situations. Common growth spells (accelerations, 
deceleration, and stable periods) have also been identified, and growth 
transitions in Latin American countries and in the Latin American and 
Caribbean region as a whole have been compared with transitions in 
the United States and in East Asia and the Pacific. 
Key observations are made about growth transitions and about 
the relationships among investment, national saving, foreign saving 
and growth. More specifically, evidence is provided that demonstrates 
the following points: 
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(i) Although growth needs to be sustained by higher investment rates, an initial impulse 
from investment is not required in order for growth to accelerate. It is not always the case that 
investment leads growth, since growth may also accelerate as a result of improved consumer 
confidence, productivity-driven economic reforms or idle capital stock. Growth leads investment in 
about 55% of the acceleration transitions and in roughly 43% of decelerations. Growth accelerations 
may also be preceded by falling or stable investment rates, as occurred in Argentina in 2002-2005 
and Chile in 1983-1992.  
(ii) Not all investment accelerations are accompanied or followed by growth accelerations. 
Growth may decelerate while the investment rate is rising (e.g., Colombia in 1991-1999 and Peru in 
1973-1981). Investment in construction or public investment has proved to be less effective in the 
Latin American and Caribbean region (see Gutiérrez, 2005; Solimano and Gutiérrez, 2006). 
(iii) Although the evidence has shown that high growth needs to be sustained by high 
national savings rates, it is not always the case that growth accelerations are accompanied by rising 
national savings rates; the latter may also decline. Growth does not necessarily generate higher 
national saving either (e.g., Brazil in 1991-1995 and Mexico in 1986-1991). Growth accelerations 
may be oriented towards consumption, and when this occurs it is reflected in a mounting current-
account deficit financed by foreign capital inflows (foreign saving). When foreign saving is a 
substitute for national saving, then growth may occur in the presence of falling national savings 
rates.  
(iv) The high correlation between national saving and investment does not mean that 
national saving must necessarily rise in order to finance investment. Accelerations in investment 
have also been financed by rising foreign saving (while national saving has shrunk, as occurred in 
Argentina in 1991-1996 and in Chile in 1977-1979). As noted earlier, the substitution of foreign 
saving for national saving can make it possible to achieve higher investment growth based on a 
combination of higher foreign saving and lower national saving. 
(v) Foreign saving does not, in most cases, add to total saving (equal to investment), 
and the crowding out of national saving by foreign saving seems to be positively biased (being 
stronger when foreign saving is rising). The instances in which investment and foreign saving 
precede each other is approximately the same: between 20% and 30% of accelerations and 
decelerations.  
(vi) Episodes in which rising foreign savings rates have been combined with falling 
investment have been identified (e.g., Argentina in 1978-1982 and Chile in 1980-1982), as well as 
episodes of rising foreign saving with declining growth (e.g., Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 
1976-1978, Brazil in 1996-1999 and Peru in 1981-1983). Consumption-oriented accelerations of 
foreign saving reflect a strong substitution of foreign saving for national saving and a net reduction 
in national saving (and a rise in consumption). These situations constitute cases in which national 
saving has been more than fully crowded-out by foreign saving. Episodes of rising foreign saving 
(and falling national saving) and declining growth are worse in the sense that they signal profound 
imbalances which, in many cases, are caused by growing fiscal deficits.  
(vii) Common transitions for the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole are more 
likely to be observed for GDP growth and investment (more than 50% of the accelerations and more 
than 40% of the decelerations). Country-specific transitions are found more frequently in the case of 
national saving. Foreign saving co-movements are to be observed in about 50% of the cases in the 
Latin American and Caribbean region. The probability of common growth and foreign saving 
transitions was found to increase after the 1990s, which is interpreted as an indication of increased 
growth volatility during this new wave of globalization. 
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The results of this study show no common pattern of co-occurrence or precedence in relation 
to growth, investment, national saving and foreign saving, which suggests that co-movements 
among these variables depend on the particular circumstances existing in each country. The 
interaction between common and country-specific factors gives rise to variations in co-movements 
and causality relationships across time and countries. The application of general theoretical 
considerations or econometric results may therefore give rise to misleading interpretations of 
growth processes and oversimplification in the design of growth policies in the region.  
The diversity of the causality results across countries for growth, investment, and national 
and foreign saving suggests that growth is the result of forces whose dynamic and motion are 
continuously changing through time and that are strongly influenced by the economic and social 
framework in which they interact. Key forces in the growth process include investment, national 
saving and foreign saving, but different growth sources (such as improvements in human capital, 
discoveries, better economic policies, pro-growth reforms or positive political and social events) are 
required to improve investor and consumer sentiment and set those forces into motion in a way that 
will give rise to a virtuous circle with growth (Solimano and Gutiérrez, 2006). 
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GROWTH TRANSITIONS (SUMMARY), 1960-2005 
 
World regions  United States: Per 
capita GDP growth 
rate 
OECD countries: Per 
capita GDP growth 
rate 
East Asia and the 
Pacific: Per capita 
GDP growth rate 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean Per capita 
GDP growth rate 
  Accelerations                 
  1961-1965 (2.96) 1961-1966 (4.22) 1961-1965 (-0.25) 1964-1971 (2.97) 
  1971-1972 (2.08) 1976-1977 (2.39) 1968-1970 (4.73) 1984-1986 (-0.37) 
  1975-1977 (2.23) 1982-1987 (2.54) 1975-1978 (4.63) 1990-1994 (1.31) 
  1982-1985 (2.42) 1994-1998 (1.97) 1982-1983 (5.89) 2002-2005 (1.09) 
  1992-1997 (1.95) 2003-2005 (1.72) 1990-1994 (7.77)     
  2003-2005 (2.07)     2000-2005 (6.95)     
  Decelerations                 
  1966-1970 (2.54) 1967-1975 (3.41) 1966-1967 (4.28) 1972-1983 (1.77) 
  1973-1974 (2.00) 1978-1981 (1.91) 1971-1974 (4.44) 1995-2001 (1.00) 
  1978-1981 (1.62) 1988-1993 (2.09) 1995-1999 (6.27)     
  1986-1991 (2.04) 1999-2002 (1.77)         
  1998-2002 (2.03)             
  Stationary                 
          1979-1981 (5.52) 1961-1963 (1.83) 










(% of GDP) 
National saving 
(% of GDP) 
Foreign saving 
(% of GDP) 
  Accelerations                 
  1964-1971 (2.97) 1964-1977 (21.83) 1967-1976 (19.78) 1978-1980 (3.24) 
  1984-1986 (-0.37) 1986-1997 (20.61) 1985-1988 (19.08) 1989-1998 (2.34) 
  1990-1994 (1.31) 2004-2005 (20.03) 2001-2005 (20.01)    
  2002-2005 (1.09)            
  Decelerations                 
  1972-1983 (1.77) 1960-1963 (20.10) 1977-1984 (19.82) 1981-1988 (1.64) 
  1995-2001 (1.00) 1978-1985 (22.00)     1999-2005 (0.79) 
     1998-2003 (20.57)        
  Stationary               
  1961-1963 (1.83)     1989-2000 (18.50) 1967-1977 (2.34) 
  1987-1989 (0.05)            
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Table A.1 (continued) 
 
Argentina Per capita GDP growth 
(annual %) 
Gross capital formation
(% of GDP) 
National saving 
(% of GDP) 
Foreign saving 
(% of GDP) 
  Accelerations                 
  1961-1969 (2.22) 1967-1977 (24.36) 2000-2004 (18.07) 1976-1982 (1.11) 
  1989-1993 (2.45) 1991-1996 (17.77)     1991-1997 (2.72) 
  2002-2005 (1.13) 2003-2004 (16.05)        
  Decelerations                 
  1970-1976 (1.50) 1960-1962 (23.65) 1976-1999 (18.37) 1983-1990 (1.97) 
  1980-1983 (-1.51) 1978-1990 (20.74)     1998-2004 (-0.69) 
  1994-2001 (0.66) 1997-2002 (16.83)        
  Stationary                
  1977-1979 (0.30) 1963-1965 (21.31)        
  1984-1988 (-1.68)            
 
Brazil Per capita GDP growth 
(annual %) 
Gross capital formation
(% of GDP) 
National saving 
(% of GDP) 
Foreign saving 
(% of GDP) 
  Accelerations                 
  1965-1972 (5.59) 1967-1975 (21.98) 1984-1989 (19.66) 1978-1980 (4.43) 
  1983-1986 (1.08) 1985-1989 (20.59) 2000-2005 (19.44) 1992-1999 (2.28) 
  1991-1995 (0.82) 1993-1996 (21.21)        
  2003-2005 (0.97)            
  Decelerations                 
  1961-1964 (0.97) 1960-1966 (19.58) 1975-1983 (18.13) 1975-1977 (4.49) 
  1973-1982 (3.27) 1976-1984 (21.39) 1990-1999 (19.37) 1981-1989 (1.66) 
  1987-1990 (0.06) 1990-1992 (21.05)     2000-2005 (0.95) 
  1996-1999 (0.99) 1997-2005 (20.64)        
  Stationary                 
  2000-2002 (0.57)         1990-1991 (-0.28) 
 
Chile Per capita GDP growth 
(annual %) 
Gross capital formation
(% of GDP) 
National saving 
(% of GDP) 
Foreign saving 
(% of GDP) 
  Accelerations                 
  1975-1979 (1.65) 1963-1967 (18.09) 1975-1976 (13.79) 1975-1982 (6.43) 
  1983-1992 (4.26) 1973-1979 (18.23) 1984-1992 (16.99) 1991-1996 (3.00) 
  2001-2005 (2.72) 1984-1995 (22.42) 2002-2005 (22.01)    
      2004-2005 (21.99)        
  Decelerations                 
  1968-1974 (-0.15) 1968-1972 (17.49) 1977-1983 (10.08) 1983-1990 (5.35) 
  1980-1982 (0.91) 1980-1983 (16.72) 1997-2001 (21.52) 1997-2005 (1.28) 
  1993-2000 (4.15) 1996-2003 (23.69)        
  Stationary                 
  1961-1967 (2.10) 1960-1962 (17.22) 1993-1996 (22.73)    
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Table A.1 (continued) 
 
Colombia Per capita GDP growth 
(annual %) 
Gross capital formation
(% of GDP) 
National saving 
(% of GDP) 
Foreign saving 
(% of GDP) 
  Accelerations                 
  1966-1971 (3.04) 1965-1969 (19.40) 1972-1977 (17.64) 1968-1970 (3.47) 
  1984-1988 (1.83) 1977-1982 (19.05) 1984-1991 (18.10) 1978-1983 (2.74) 
  2000-2005 (0.92) 1991-1995 (20.95) 2001-2005 (16.80) 1991-1996 (1.96) 
      2002-2005 (16.92)        
  Decelerations                 
  1972-1975 (3.30) 1960-1964 (19.14) 1968-1971 (16.76) 1971-1977 (1.25) 
  1979-1983 (1.08) 1970-1976 (18.94) 1978-1983 (16.53) 1984-1990 (1.03) 
  1995-1999 (0.11) 1983-1990 (18.96) 1992-2000 (17.12) 1997-2005 (1.53) 
      1996-2001 (17.89)        
  Stationary                 
  1961-1965 (1.56)          
  1976-1978 (2.68)          
  1989-1994 (2.22)             
 
Costa Rica Per capita GDP growth 
(annual %) 
Gross capital formation
(% of GDP) 
National saving 
(% of GDP) 
Foreign saving 
(% of GDP) 
  Accelerations                 
  1961-1971 (3.31) 1965-1981 (22.59) 1980-1987 (17.56) 1977-1980 (11.34) 
  1983-1992 (1.34) 1998-2005 (18.87) 2000-2004 (15.67) 1987-1989 (4.70) 
             1997-2004 (4.36) 
  Decelerations                 
  1972-1982 (1.45) 1988-1997 (21.07) 1977-1979 (13.83) 1981-1986 (7.79) 
  1993-1996 (2.50)     1988-1999 (16.53) 1990-1996 (3.98) 
  2000-2003 (1.77)            
  Stationary               
  1997-1999 (2.49) 1960-1964 (18.31)        
  2004-2005 (2.12) 1982-1987 (25.40)        
 
Mexico Per capita GDP growth 
(annual %) 
Gross capital formation
(% of GDP) 
National saving 
(% of GDP) 
Foreign saving 
(% of GDP) 
  Accelerations                 
  1961-1964 (4.11) 1960-1980 (21.02) 1994-1998 (19.82) 1986-1992 (2.12) 
  1971-1972 (2.78) 1987-1991 (21.80) 2003-2005 (20.18)    
  1976-1979 (3.99) 1995-1998 (23.23)        
  1986-1991 (0.20)            
  1995-1998 (1.65)            
  Decelerations                 
  1965-1970 (3.26) 1981-1986 (22.05) 1985-1993 (19.51) 1979-1985 (1.91) 
  1980-1985 (0.47) 1999-2002 (22.50) 1999-2002 (20.02) 1993-1997 (3.67) 
  1992-1994 (0.83)         2001-2005 (1.63) 
  1999-2003 (1.75)            
  Stationary               
  1973-1975 (2.99) 1992-1994 (22.36) 1979-1984 (21.66) 1998-2000 (2.69) 
  2004-2005 (1.37) 2003-2005 (21.38)        
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Table A.1 (conclusion) 
 
Peru Per capita GDP growth 
(annual %) 
Gross capital formation
(% of GDP) 
National saving 
(% of GDP) 
Foreign saving 
(% of GDP) 
  Accelerations                 
  1969-1973 (1.53) 1973-1981 (23.29) 1977-1981 (21.97) 1980-1988 (4.56) 
  1984-1985 (-0.93) 1992-1997 (21.55) 1992-1999 (15.83) 1992-1995 (6.41) 
  1990-1995 (0.31)     2003-2005 (18.45)    
  2001-2005 (2.12)            
  Decelerations                 
  1961-1968 (2.53) 1960-1972 (31.25) 1982-1991 (17.52) 1977-1979 (2.22) 
  1974-1977 (0.83) 1982-1991 (22.98)     1989-1991 (6.41) 
  1981-1983 (-1.46) 1998-2005 (19.92)     1996-2005 (2.85) 
  1986-1989 (-3.06)            
  1996-2000 (1.66)            
  Stationary               





Per capita GDP growth 
(annual %) 
Gross capital formation
(% of GDP) 
National saving 
(% of GDP) 
Foreign saving 
(% of GDP) 
  Accelerations                 
  1972-1975 (0.54) 1960-1977 (28.33) 1970-1975 (35.81) 1975-1978 (-0.83) 
  1983-1991 (-0.60) 1985-1987 (20.08) 1989-1990 (20.35) 1984-1987 (-1.36) 
  2002-2005 (0.04) 1991-1999 (20.95) 1993-2004 (27.50) 1991-1993 (-1.98) 
             1997-1998 (-3.30) 
  Decelerations                 
  1964-1971 (0.83) 1978-1984 (27.08) 1976-1988 (27.24) 1970-1974 (-3.14) 
  1976-1982 (-2.20) 1988-1990 (18.55) 1991-1992 (19.78) 1979-1983 (-1.29) 
  1992-2001 (-0.90) 2000-2004 (22.38)     1988-1990 (-1.75) 
             1994-1996 (-3.20) 
             1999-2004 (-7.82) 
  Stationary               
  1961-1963 (2.34)            
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Figure A.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH, GROSS 
CAPITAL FORMATION AND NATIONAL AND FOREIGN SAVING 
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GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
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Figure A.1 (conclusion) 



































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
































































National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Table A.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: 






formation   
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings    
(% of GDP)
Foreign 









1967 A A A S
1968 A A A S
1969 A A A S
1970 A A A S
1971 A A A S
1972 D A A S
1973 D A A S
1974 D A A S
1975 D A A S
1976 D A A S
1977 D A D S
1978 D D D A
1979 D D D A
1980 D D D A
1981 D D D D
1982 D D D D
1983 D D D D
1984 A D D D
1985 A D A D
1986 A A A D
1987 S A A D
1988 S A A D
1989 S A S A
1990 A A S A
1991 A A S A
1992 A A S A
1993 A A S A
1994 A A S A
1995 D A S A
1996 D A S A
1997 D A S A
1998 D D S A
1999 D D S D
2000 D D S D
2001 D D A D
2002 A D A D
2003 A D A D
2004 A A A D
2005 A A A D
A Acceleration D Deceleration
S Stability  
Source: author’s elaboration. 
Note: All series have been HP filtered. 
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Figure A.2 
UNITED STATES, OECD, EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC: GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE, 
AVERAGE GROWTH RATE PER SPELL, AND COMOVEMENTS WITH LATIN AMERICA 

































































USA: GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered)



































































OECD: GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered)
OECD: GDP per capita Average Growth Rate  
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Figure A.2 (conclusion) 

































































East Asia & Pacific: GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered)
East Asia & Pacific: GDP per capita Average Growth Rate
Source: author’s elaboration. 




ACCELERATIONS AND DECELERATIONS SUMMARY 
Year







East Asia & 
Pacific: GDP per 
capita growth   
(annual %)
Latin America & 
Caribbean: GDP 
per capita growth 
(annual %)
1960
1961 A A A S
1962 A A A S
1963 A A A S
1964 A A A A
1965 A A A A
1966 D A D A
1967 D D D A
1968 D D A A
1969 D D A A
1970 D D A A
1971 A D D A
1972 A D D D
1973 D D D D
1974 D D D D
1975 A D A D
1976 A A A D
1977 A A A D
1978 D D A D
1979 D D S D
1980 D D S D
1981 D D S D
1982 A A A D
1983 A A A D
1984 A A S A
1985 A A S A
1986 D A S A
1987 D A S S
1988 D D S S
1989 D D S S
1990 D D A A
1991 D D A A
1992 A D A A
1993 A D A A
1994 A A A A
1995 A A D D
1996 A A D D
1997 A A D D
1998 D A D D
1999 D D D D
2000 D D A D
2001 D D A D
2002 D D A A
2003 A A A A
2004 A A A A
2005 A A A A
A Acceleration D Deceleration
S Stability  
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
Note: All series have been HP filtered 
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Table A.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS 
Year   Series 
definitions 
 
   GDP: Per capita GDP growth (annual %, HP-filtered) 
Pairwise Granger causality 
tests 
  INV: Gross capital formation (% of GDP, HP-filtered) 
Sample: 1960 2005   FS : Foreign saving (% of GDP, HP-filtered) 
Lags: 3   NS : National saving (% of GDP, HP-filtered) 
      
  Null hypothesis: Obs F-
statistic 
Probability  Conclusion 
      
INV does not Granger-cause 
GDP 
42 11.0421 3.00E-05 * At 1% significance level,  INV Granger-
causes GDP 
GDP  does not Granger-
cause INV 
 12.784 8.50E-06 * At 1% significance level, GDP Granger-
causes INV 
      
NS does not Granger-cause 
GDP 
36 2.77042 0.0594 *** At 10% significance level, NS Granger-
causes GDP 
GDP does not Granger-cause 
NS  
 2.7165 0.06288 *** At 10% significance level, GDP Granger-
causes NS  
      
FS does not Granger-cause 
GDP 
36 6.32135 0.00197 * At 1% significance level, FS Granger-
causes GDP 
GDP does not Granger-cause 
FS  
 4.48089 0.01056 ** At 5% significance level, GDP Granger-
causes FS  
      
NS does not Granger-cause 
INV 
36 0.49009 0.69188   NS does not Granger-cause INV 
INV does not Granger-cause 
NS  
 0.68415 0.56897   INV does not Granger-cause NS  
      
FS does not Granger-cause 
INV 
36 0.7571 0.5273   FS does not Granger-cause INV 
INV does not Granger-cause 
FS  
 0.60115 0.61947   INV does not Granger-cause FS  
      
FS does not Granger-cause 
NS  
36 0.92564 0.4408   FS does not Granger-cause NS  
NS does not Granger-cause 
FS  
 0.59704 0.62206   NS does not Granger-cause FS  
Source: author’s elaboration. 
Note: Significance level: (*) 1%, (**) 5%, (***) 10%. 
 




PROBABILITY OF LEADS AND LAGS AMONG GROWTH, INVESTMENT AND SAVING 
Total Growth 






  Accelerations 27 4 1 15 8 2 7 4 2 9
  Decelerations 28 6 3 12 5 4 5 3 2 16
  Stationary 13 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Percentages
  Accelerations 14.8% 3.7% 55.6% 29.6% 7.4% 25.9% 14.8% 7.4% 33.3%
  Decelerations 21.4% 10.7% 42.9% 17.9% 14.3% 17.9% 10.7% 7.1% 57.1%
  Stationary 0.0% 7.7% 7.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
   Probability of Leads and Lags on Growth














  Accelerations 25 11 3 2 5 4 7 19 8 2 4
  Decelerations 27 7 4 3 9 1 5 17 7 1 5
  Stationary 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Percentages
  Accelerations 44.0% 12.0% 8.0% 20.0% 16.0% 28.0% 42.1% 10.5% 21.1%
  Decelerations 25.9% 14.8% 11.1% 33.3% 3.7% 18.5% 41.2% 5.9% 29.4%
  Stationary 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Probability of Leads and Lags on Investment Rate Probability of Leads and Lags on National Saving Rate
Foreign Saving RateNational Saving Rate Foreign Saving Rate
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Figure A.3 
ARGENTINA: GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH 
INVESTMENT, NATIONAL AND FOREIGN SAVING RATES 




























































Common Acceleration Common Deceleration
Common Stability Period GDP per capita Growth Rate (HP Filtered)
GDP per capita Average Growth Rate  
 



































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
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Figure A.3 (conclusion) 




































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
 



































































National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Table A.6 








formation   
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings     
(% of GDP)
Foreign 







formation    
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings      
(% of GDP)
Foreign 
Savings     
(% of GDP)
1960 D D
1961 A D D
1962 A D D
1963 A S
1964 A S A
1965 A S A
1966 A A A A
1967 A A A A
1968 A A A A
1969 A A A A
1970 D A A
1971 D A A
1972 D A D A
1973 D A D A
1974 D A D A
1975 D A D A
1976 D A D A D A
1977 S A D A A D
1978 S D D A D D A
1979 S D D A D D A
1980 D D D A D D D A
1981 D D D A D D D
1982 D D D A D D D
1983 D D D D D D D D
1984 S D D D D D D
1985 S D D D D D
1986 S D D D D
1987 S D D D S D
1988 S D D D S D
1989 A D D D
1990 A D D D A
1991 A A D A A A A
1992 A A D A A A A
1993 A A D A A A A
1994 D A D A A A
1995 D A D A D A A
1996 D A D A D A A
1997 D D D A D A
1998 D D D D D D
1999 D D D D D D D
2000 D D A D D D D
2001 D D A D D D A D
2002 A D A D A D A D
2003 A A A D A A D
2004 A A A D A A A D
2005 A A
A Acceleration D Deceleration S Stability
Argentina:                                   
Accelerations and Decelerations
Argentina and Latin America & Caribbean: 
Common Accelerations and Decelerations
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Table A.7 
ARGENTINA: GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
Series Definitions
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1960 2005
Lags: 3
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability Conclusion
  INV does not Granger Cause GDP 41 0.9643 0.4208    INV does not Granger Cause GDP 
  GDP  does not Granger Cause INV 3.65772 0.02184 **   At 5% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause INV
  NS  does not Granger Cause GDP 25 0.43963 0.72743    NS  does not Granger Cause GDP 
  GDP  does not Granger Cause NS 1.38923 0.27827    GDP  does not Granger Cause NS 
  FS  does not Granger Cause GDP 26 2.73087 0.07248 ***   At 10% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause FS 2.95776 0.05852 ***   At 10% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause FS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause INV 24 2.06811 0.14246    NS  does not Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause NS 1.22892 0.32983    INV does not Granger Cause NS 
  FS  does not Granger Cause INV 26 4.75895 0.01223 **   At 5% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause FS 0.12129 0.94643    INV does not Granger Cause FS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause NS 24 13.6506 0.000088 *   At 1% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause NS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause FS 2.58986 0.08669 ***   At 10% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause FS 
ARGENTINA: HP Filtered Series
GDP: GDP per capita growth (annual %, HP filtered)
INV: Gross capital formation (% of GDP, HP filtered)
FS : Foreign Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
NS : National Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
 
Note: Significance level: (*) 1%, (**) 5%, (***) 10%. 
 
Table A.8 
ARGENTINA: PROBABILITY OF GROWTH TRANSITIONS OCCURRENCE, COUNTRY 














GDP per capita 22.22% 75.00% 15.79% 77.78% 25.00% 84.21%
Gross Capital Formation 5.00% 100.00% 27.27% 95.00% 0.00% 72.73%
National Savings 20.00% -- 66.67% 80.00% -- 33.33%
Foreign Savings 28.57% -- 20.00% 71.43% -- 80.00%
Period 1960-2006















GDP per capita 40.00% 75.00% 18.18% 60.00% 25.00% 81.82%
Gross Capital Formation 0.00% 100.00% 26.67% 100.00% 0.00% 73.33%
National Savings .. .. 42.86% .. .. 57.14%
Foreign Savings 57.14% .. 14.29% 42.86% .. 85.71%
Period 1960-1989















GDP per capita 0.00% .. 12.50% 100.00% .. 87.50%
Gross Capital Formation 12.50% .. 28.57% 87.50% .. 71.43%
National Savings 20.00% .. 100.00% 80.00% .. 0.00%
Foreign Savings 0.00% .. 25.00% 100.00% .. 75.00%
Period 1990-2006
Country Specific Growth Transitions Common Growth Transitions
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Figure A.4 
BRAZIL: GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH INVESTMENT, 
NATIONAL AND FOREIGN SAVING RATES 


























































Common Acceleration Common Deceleration
Common Stability Period GDP per capita Growth Rate (HP Filtered)
GDP per capita Average Growth Rate
 
 

































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
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Figure A.4 (conclusion) 


































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
 



































































National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Table A.9 








formation    
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings     
(% of GDP)
Foreign 











Savings      
(% of GDP)
Foreign 
Savings      
(% of GDP)
1960 D D
1961 D D D
1962 D D D
1963 D D D
1964 D D
1965 A D A
1966 A D A
1967 A A A A
1968 A A A A
1969 A A A A
1970 A A A A
1971 A A A A
1972 A A A
1973 D A D A
1974 D A D A
1975 D A D D D A
1976 D D D D D
1977 D D D D D D
1978 D D D A D D D A
1979 D D D A D D D A
1980 D D D A D D D A
1981 D D D D D D D D
1982 D D D D D D D D
1983 A D D D D D D
1984 A D A D A D D
1985 A A A D A A D
1986 A A A D A A A D
1987 D A A D A A D
1988 D A A D A A D
1989 D A A D A
1990 D D D S
1991 A D D S A
1992 A D D A A A
1993 A A D A A A A
1994 A A D A A A A
1995 A A D A A A
1996 D A D A D A A
1997 D D D A D A
1998 D D D A D D A
1999 D D D A D D
2000 S D A D D D
2001 S D A D D A D
2002 S D A D D A D
2003 A D A D A D A D
2004 A D A D A A D
2005 A D A D A A D
A Acceleration D Deceleration S Stability
Brazil:                                        
Accelerations and Decelerations
Brazil and Latin America & Caribbean: 
Common Accelerations and Decelerations
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
Note: All series have been HP filtered. 
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Table A.10 
BRAZIL: GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
Series Definitions
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1960 2005
Lags: 3
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability Conclusion
  INV does not Granger Cause GDP 42 15.0364 1.90E-06 *   At 1% significance level,  INV Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause INV 7.9878 0.00035 *   At 1% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause INV
  NS  does not Granger Cause GDP 26 2.15343 0.12712    NS  does not Granger Cause GDP 
  GDP  does not Granger Cause NS 6.54998 0.00316 *   At 1% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause NS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause GDP 28 1.27425 0.30892    FS   does not Granger Cause GDP 
  GDP  does not Granger Cause FS 4.66784 0.01189 **   At 5% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause FS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause INV 26 7.66977 0.00148 *   At 1% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause NS 9.74076 0.00042 *   At 1% significance level,  INV Granger Cause NS 
  FS  does not Granger Cause INV 28 1.31647 0.29548    FS  does not Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause FS 3.62412 0.02984 **   At 5% significance level,  INV Granger Cause FS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause NS 26 8.50173 0.00087 *   At 1% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause NS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause FS 5.06029 0.00961 *   At 1% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause FS 
BRAZIL: HP Filtered Series
GDP: GDP per capita growth (annual %, HP filtered)
INV: Gross capital formation (% of GDP, HP filtered)
FS : Foreign Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
NS : National Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
 
Note: Significance level: (*) 1%, (**) 5%, (***) 10%. 
 
Table A.11 
BRAZIL: PROBABILITY OF GROWTH TRANSITIONS OCCURRENCE, COUNTRY SPECIFIC 














GDP per capita 16.67% .. 41.18% 83.33% .. 58.82%
Gross Capital Formation 7.14% .. 31.25% 92.86% .. 68.75%
National Savings 33.33% .. 22.22% 66.67% .. 77.78%
Foreign Savings 0.00% .. 33.33% 100.00% .. 66.67%
Period 1960-1989















GDP per capita 12.50% 100.00% 20.00% 87.50% 0.00% 80.00%
Gross Capital Formation 0.00% .. 50.00% 100.00% .. 50.00%
National Savings 16.67% .. 100.00% 83.33% .. 0.00%
Foreign Savings 12.50% 100.00% 0.00% 87.50% 0.00% 100.00%
Period 1990-2006















GDP per capita 15.00% 100.00% 36.36% 85.00% 0.00% 63.64%
Gross Capital Formation 5.56% -- 39.29% 94.44% -- 60.71%
National Savings 25.00% -- 63.16% 75.00% -- 36.84%
Foreign Savings 9.09% 100.00% 22.22% 90.91% 0.00% 77.78%
Period 1960-2006
Country Specific Growth Transitions Common Growth Transitions
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Figure A.5 
CHILE: GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH INVESTMENT, 
NATIONAL AND FOREIGN SAVING RATES 


























































Common Acceleration Common Deceleration
Common Stability Period GDP per capita Growth Rate (HP Filtered)
GDP per capita Average Growth Rate
 
 

































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
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Figure A.5 (conclusion) 


































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
 

































































National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Table A.12 





growth     
(annual %)
Gross capital 
formation    
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings    
(% of GDP)
Foreign 




growth      
(annual %)
Gross capital 
formation    
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings     
(% of GDP)
Foreign 
Savings    
(% of GDP)
1960 S
1961 S S S
1962 S S S
1963 S A S
1964 S A A
1965 S A A
1966 S A A





1972 D D D
1973 D A D A
1974 D A D A
1975 A A A A A A
1976 A A A A A A
1977 A A D A A D
1978 A A D A D A
1979 A A D A D A
1980 D D D A D D D A
1981 D D D A D D D
1982 D D D A D D D
1983 A D D D D D D
1984 A A A D A D
1985 A A A D A A D
1986 A A A D A A A D
1987 A A A D A A D
1988 A A A D A A D
1989 A A A D A
1990 A A A D A A
1991 A A A A A A A
1992 A A A A A A A
1993 D A S A A S A
1994 D A S A A S A
1995 D A S A D A S A
1996 D D S A D S A
1997 D D D D D
1998 D D D D D D
1999 D D D D D D D
2000 D D D D D D D
2001 A D D D D D
2002 A D A D A D A D
2003 A D A D A D A D
2004 A A A D A A A D
2005 A A A D A A A D
A Acceleration D Deceleration S Stability
Chile:                                        
Accelerations and Decelerations
Chile and Latin America & Caribbean: 
Common Accelerations and Decelerations
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
Note: All series have been HP filtered. 
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Table A.13 
CHILE: GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
Series Definitions
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1960 2005
Lags: 3
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability Conclusion
  INV does not Granger Cause GDP 42 2.43952 0.08073 ***   At 10% significance level,  INV Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause INV 6.55441 0.00124 *   At 1% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause INV
  NS  does not Granger Cause GDP 26 3.84347 2.63E-02 **   At 5% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause NS 52.0541 2.30E-09 *   At 1% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause NS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause GDP 28 3.21516 0.04366 **   At 5% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause FS 0.1041 0.95676    GDP  does not Granger Cause FS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause INV 26 4.98248 0.01022 **   At 5% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause NS 71.1558 1.60E-10 *   At 1% significance level,  INV Granger Cause NS 
  FS  does not Granger Cause INV 28 1.95865 0.15115    FS  does not Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause FS 1.18187 0.34051    INV does not Granger Cause FS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause NS 26 1.18198 0.34298    FS   does not Granger Cause NS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause FS 3.03113 0.05466 ***   At 10% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause FS 
FS : Foreign Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
NS : National Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
CHILE: HP Filtered Series
GDP: GDP per capita growth (annual %, HP filtered)
INV: Gross capital formation (% of GDP, HP filtered)
 
Note: Significance level: (*) 1%, (**) 5%, (***) 10%. 
 
Table A.14 
CHILE: PROBABILITY OF GROWTH TRANSITIONS OCCURRENCE, COUNTRY SPECIFIC 














GDP per capita 18.18% 55.56% 0.00% 81.82% 44.44% 100.00%
Gross Capital Formation 45.45% .. 63.16% 54.55% .. 36.84%
National Savings 25.00% .. 40.00% 75.00% .. 60.00%
Foreign Savings 66.67% .. 61.54% 33.33% .. 38.46%
Period 1960-1989














GDP per capita 33.33% 100.00% 0.00% 66.67% 0.00% 100.00%
Gross Capital Formation 22.22% .. 42.86% 77.78% .. 57.14%
National Savings 28.57% .. 100.00% 71.43% .. 0.00%
Foreign Savings 0.00% .. 30.00% 100.00% .. 70.00%
Period 1990-2006














GDP per capita 50.00% 57.14% 33.33% 50.00% 42.86% 66.67%
Gross Capital Formation 19.23% 100.00% 41.18% 80.77% 0.00% 58.82%
National Savings 33.33% 0.00% 41.67% 66.67% 100.00% 58.33%
Foreign Savings 35.71% -- 23.53% 64.29% -- 76.47%
Country Specific Growth Transitions Common Growth Transitions
Period 1960-2006
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Figure A.6 
COLOMBIA: GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH 
INVESTMENT, NATIONAL AND FOREIGN SAVING RATES 



























































Common Acceleration Common Deceleration
Common Stability Period GDP per capita Growth Rate (HP Filtered)
GDP per capita Average Growth Rate  
 

































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
 
 
Economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean: growth transitions rather than steady states 
58 
Figure A.6 (conclusion) 



































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
 


































































National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Table A.15 








formation    
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings      
(% of GDP)
Foreign 






formation     
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings      
(% of GDP)
Foreign 
Savings      
(% of GDP)
1960 D D
1961 S D S D
1962 S D S D
1963 S D S D
1964 S D
1965 S A A
1966 A A A A
1967 A A A A
1968 A A D A A A
1969 A A D A A A
1970 A D D A A
1971 A D D D A
1972 D D A D D A
1973 D D A D D A
1974 D D A D D A
1975 D D A D D A
1976 S D A D A
1977 S A A D A
1978 S A D A D A
1979 D A D A D D A
1980 D A D A D D A
1981 D A D A D D
1982 D A D A D D
1983 D D D A D D D
1984 A D A D A D D
1985 A D A D A D A D
1986 A D A D A A D
1987 A D A D A D
1988 A D A D A D
1989 S D A D S
1990 S D A D
1991 S A A A A A
1992 S A D A A A
1993 S A D A A A
1994 S A D A A A
1995 D A D A D A A
1996 D D D A D A
1997 D D D D D
1998 D D D D D D
1999 D D D D D D D
2000 A D D D D D
2001 A D A D D A D
2002 A A A D A A D
2003 A A A D A A D
2004 A A A D A A A D
2005 A A A D A A A D
A Acceleration D Deceleration S Stability
Colombia:                                     
Accelerations and Decelerations
Colombia and Latin America & Caribbean: 
Common Accelerations and Decelerations
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
Note: All series have been HP filtered. 
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Table A.16 
COLOMBIA: GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
Series Definitions
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1960 2005
Lags: 3
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability Conclusion
  INV does not Granger Cause GDP 42 1.08227 0.3693    INV does not Granger Cause GDP 
  GDP  does not Granger Cause INV 1.05564 0.38032    GDP  does not Granger Cause INV
  NS  does not Granger Cause GDP 33 4.0633 0.0171 **   At 5% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause NS 6.85058 0.00149 *   At 1% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause NS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause GDP 35 1.18024 0.33502    FS   does not Granger Cause GDP 
  GDP  does not Granger Cause FS 0.79935 0.5047    GDP  does not Granger Cause FS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause INV 33 1.98828 0.14045    NS  does not Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause NS 4.02789 0.01769 **   At 5% significance level,  INV Granger Cause NS 
  FS  does not Granger Cause INV 35 2.31102 0.09783 ***   At 10% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause FS 1.78993 0.17197    INV does not Granger Cause FS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause NS 33 2.45137 0.08594 ***   At 10% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause NS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause FS 2.55763 0.0769 ***   At 10% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause FS 
INV: Gross capital formation (% of GDP, HP filtered)
FS : Foreign Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
NS : National Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
COLOMBIA: HP Filtered Series
GDP: GDP per capita growth (annual %, HP filtered)
 
Note: Significance level: (*) 1%, (**) 5%, (***) 10%. 
 
Table A.17 
COLOMBIA: PROBABILITY OF GROWTH TRANSITIONS OCCURRENCE, COUNTRY 














GDP per capita 18.18% 55.56% 0.00% 81.82% 44.44% 100.00%
Gross Capital Formation 45.45% .. 63.16% 54.55% .. 36.84%
National Savings 25.00% .. 40.00% 75.00% .. 60.00%
Foreign Savings 66.67% .. 61.54% 33.33% .. 38.46%
Period 1960-1989














GDP per capita 33.33% 100.00% 0.00% 66.67% 0.00% 100.00%
Gross Capital Formation 22.22% .. 42.86% 77.78% .. 57.14%
National Savings 28.57% .. 100.00% 71.43% .. 0.00%
Foreign Savings 0.00% .. 30.00% 100.00% .. 70.00%
Period 1990-2006














GDP per capita 23.53% 71.43% 0.00% 76.47% 28.57% 100.00%
Gross Capital Formation 35.00% -- 57.69% 65.00% -- 42.31%
National Savings 26.32% -- 68.42% 73.68% -- 31.58%
Foreign Savings 40.00% -- 47.83% 60.00% -- 52.17%
Period 1960-2006
Country Specific Growth Transitions Common Growth Transitions
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Figure A.7 
COSTA RICA: GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH 
INVESTMENT, NATIONAL AND FOREIGN SAVING RATES 





























































Common Acceleration Common Deceleration
Common Stability Period GDP per capita Growth Rate (HP Filtered)
GDP per capita Average Growth Rate  




































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
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Figure A.7 (conclusion) 




































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
 

































































National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Table A.18 























Savings     
(% of GDP)
Foreign 






1964 A S A
1965 A A A A
1966 A A A A
1967 A A A A
1968 A A A A
1969 A A A A
1970 A A A A
1971 A A A A
1972 D A D A
1973 D A D A
1974 D A D A
1975 D A D A
1976 D A D A
1977 D A D A D A D
1978 D A D A D D A
1979 D A D A D D A
1980 D A A A D A
1981 D A A D D D
1982 D S A D D D
1983 A S A D D
1984 A S A D A D
1985 A S A D A A D
1986 A S A D A A D
1987 A S A A A
1988 A D D A
1989 A D D A A
1990 A D D D A
1991 A D D D A
1992 A D D D A
1993 D D D D
1994 D D D D
1995 D D D D D
1996 D D D D D
1997 S D D A A
1998 S A D A A
1999 S A D A
2000 D A A A D
2001 D A A A D A
2002 D A A A A
2003 D A A A A
2004 S A A A A A
2005 S A A
A Acceleration D Deceleration S Stability
Costa Rica:                                          
Accelerations and Decelerations
Costa Rica and Latin America & Caribbean: 
Common Accelerations and Decelerations
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
Note: All series have been HP filtered. 
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Table A.19 
COSTA RICA: GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
Series Definitions
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1960 2005
Lags: 3
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability Conclusion
  INV does not Granger Cause GDP 42 4.09198 0.01367 **   At 5% significance level,  INV Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause INV 1.30252 0.28902    GDP  does not Granger Cause INV
  NS  does not Granger Cause GDP 24 2.59303 0.08643 ***   At 10% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause NS 6.79109 0.00327 *   At 1% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause NS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause GDP 25 5.71742 0.00626 *   At 1% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause FS 0.05973 0.98026    GDP  does not Granger Cause FS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause INV 24 11.5062 0.00023 *   At 1% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause NS 5.55574 0.00762 *   At 1% significance level,  INV Granger Cause NS 
  FS  does not Granger Cause INV 25 5.59919 0.00682 *   At 1% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause FS 1.27786 0.31202    INV does not Granger Cause FS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause NS 23 6.89142 0.00343 *   At 1% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause NS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause FS 4.32204 0.02061 **   At 5% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause FS 
NS : National Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
COSTA RICA: HP Filtered Series
GDP: GDP per capita growth (annual %, HP filtered)
INV: Gross capital formation (% of GDP, HP filtered)
FS : Foreign Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
 
Note: Significance level: (*) 1%, (**) 5%, (***) 10%. 
 
Table A.20 
COSTA RICA: PROBABILITY OF GROWTH TRANSITIONS OCCURRENCE, COUNTRY 














GDP per capita 38.89% .. 0.00% 61.11% .. 100.00%
Gross Capital Formation 23.53% 100.00% 100.00% 76.47% 0.00% 0.00%
National Savings 62.50% .. 40.00% 37.50% .. 60.00%
Foreign Savings 42.86% .. 0.00% 57.14% .. 100.00%
Period 1960-1989














GDP per capita 0.00% 100.00% 50.00% 100.00% 0.00% 50.00%
Gross Capital Formation 75.00% .. 100.00% 25.00% .. 0.00%
National Savings 20.00% .. 100.00% 80.00% .. 0.00%
Foreign Savings 75.00% .. 100.00% 25.00% .. 0.00%
Period 1990-2006














GDP per capita 33.33% 100.00% 21.05% 66.67% 0.00% 78.95%
Gross Capital Formation 40.00% 100.00% 100.00% 60.00% 0.00% 0.00%
National Savings 46.15% -- 80.00% 53.85% -- 20.00%
Foreign Savings 60.00% -- 53.85% 40.00% -- 46.15%
Period 1960-2006
Country Specific Growth Transitions Common Growth Transitions
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Figure A.8 
MEXICO: GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH 
INVESTMENT, NATIONAL AND FOREIGN SAVING RATES 



























































Common Acceleration Common Deceleration
Common Stability Period GDP per capita Growth Rate (HP Filtered)
GDP per capita Average Growth Rate  
 


































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
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Figure A.8 (conclusion) 



































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
 


































































National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Table A.21 





growth      
(annual %)
Gross capital 
formation    
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings     
(% of GDP)
Foreign 
Savings      
(% of GDP)
GDP per 
capita growth  
(annual %)
Gross capital 
formation     
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings     
(% of GDP)
Foreign 






1964 A A A A
1965 D A A
1966 D A A
1967 D A A
1968 D A A
1969 D A A
1970 D A A
1971 A A A A
1972 A A A
1973 S A A
1974 S A A
1975 S A A
1976 A A A
1977 A A A
1978 A A
1979 A A S D
1980 D A S D D
1981 D D S D D D D
1982 D D S D D D D
1983 D D S D D D D
1984 D D S D D D
1985 D D D D D D
1986 A D D A A
1987 A A D A A
1988 A A D A A
1989 A A D A A A
1990 A A D A A A A
1991 A A D A A A A
1992 D S D A A
1993 D S D D
1994 D S A D
1995 A A A D A
1996 A A A D A
1997 A A A D A
1998 A A A S
1999 D D D S D D
2000 D D D S D D
2001 D D D D D D D
2002 D D D D D D
2003 D S A D A D
2004 S S A D A D
2005 S S A D A D
A Acceleration D Deceleration S Stability
Mexico:                                        
Accelerations and Decelerations
Mexico and Latin America & Caribbean: Common 
Accelerations and Decelerations
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
Note: Note: All series have been HP filtered. 
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Table A.22 
MEXICO: GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
Series Definitions
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1960 2005
Lags: 3
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability Conclusion
  INV does not Granger Cause GDP 42 2.15594 0.11076    INV does not Granger Cause GDP 
  GDP  does not Granger Cause INV 1.48506 0.23549    GDP  does not Granger Cause INV
  NS  does not Granger Cause GDP 22 1.82408 0.18605    NS  does not Granger Cause GDP 
  GDP  does not Granger Cause NS 7.39973 0.00286 *   At 1% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause NS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause GDP 24 5.07559 0.01085 **   At 5% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause FS 5.66606 0.00704 *   At 1% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause FS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause INV 22 3.17779 0.05482 ***   At 10% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause NS 11.9049 0.0003 *   At 1% significance level,  INV Granger Cause NS 
  FS  does not Granger Cause INV 24 5.54431 0.00769 *   At 1% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause FS 2.71745 0.07703 ***   At 10% significance level,  INV Granger Cause FS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause NS 22 2.4241 0.10614    FS   does not Granger Cause NS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause FS 3.71016 0.03538 **   At 5% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause FS 
INV: Gross capital formation (% of GDP, HP filtered)
FS : Foreign Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
NS : National Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
MEXICO: HP Filtered Series
GDP: GDP per capita growth (annual %, HP filtered)
 
Note: Significance level: (*) 1%, (**) 5%, (***) 10%. 
 
Table A.23 
MEXICO: PROBABILITY OF GROWTH TRANSITIONS OCCURRENCE, COUNTRY SPECIFIC 














GDP per capita 78.57% 100.00% 66.67% 21.43% 0.00% 33.33%
Gross Capital Formation 29.17% .. 16.67% 70.83% .. 83.33%
National Savings .. 100.00% 100.00% .. 0.00% 0.00%
Foreign Savings 75.00% .. 28.57% 25.00% .. 71.43%
Period 1960-1989














GDP per capita 66.67% 100.00% 62.50% 33.33% 0.00% 37.50%
Gross Capital Formation 16.67% 100.00% 0.00% 83.33% 0.00% 100.00%
National Savings 62.50% .. 100.00% 37.50% .. 0.00%
Foreign Savings 0.00% 100.00% 50.00% 100.00% 0.00% 50.00%
Period 1990-2006














GDP per capita 75.00% 100.00% 65.00% 25.00% 0.00% 35.00%
Gross Capital Formation 26.67% 100.00% 10.00% 73.33% 0.00% 90.00%
National Savings 62.50% 100.00% 100.00% 37.50% 0.00% 0.00%
Foreign Savings 42.86% 100.00% 41.18% 57.14% 0.00% 58.82%
Period 1960-2006
Country Specific Growth Transitions Common Growth Transitions
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Figure A.9 
PERU: GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH INVESTMENT, 
NATIONAL AND FOREIGN SAVING RATES 


























































Common Acceleration Common Deceleration
Common Stability Period GDP per capita Growth Rate (HP Filtered)
GDP per capita Average Growth Rate  




































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
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Figure A.9 (conclusion) 


































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
 





































































National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
Source: author’s elaboration. 
CEPAL - SERIE Macroeconomía del desarrollo N° 58 
71 
Table A.24 





growth     
(annual %)
Gross capital 
formation    
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings      
(% of GDP)
Foreign 




growth     
(annual %)
Gross capital 
formation    
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings     
(% of GDP)
Foreign 
Savings    
(% of GDP)
1960 D D
1961 D D D
1962 D D D






1969 A D A
1970 A D A
1971 A D A
1972 A D
1973 A A A
1974 D A D A
1975 D A D A
1976 D A D A
1977 D A A D D A
1978 S A A D
1979 S A A D
1980 S A A A A
1981 D A A A D
1982 D D D A D D D
1983 D D D A D D D
1984 A D D A A D D
1985 A D D A A D
1986 D D D A
1987 D D D A
1988 D D D A
1989 D D D D
1990 A D D D A
1991 A D D D A
1992 A A A A A A A
1993 A A A A A A A
1994 A A A A A A A
1995 A A A A A A
1996 D A A D D A
1997 D A A D D A
1998 D D A D D D
1999 D D A D D D D
2000 D D S D D D S D
2001 A D S D D D
2002 A D S D A D D
2003 A D A D A D A D
2004 A D A D A A D
2005 A D A D A A D
A Acceleration D Deceleration S Stability
Peru:                                          
Accelerations and Decelerations
Peru and Latin America & Caribbean: 
Common Accelerations and Decelerations
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
Note: All series have been HP filtered. 
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Table A.25 
PERU: GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
Series Definitions
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1960 2005
Lags: 3
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability Conclusion
  INV does not Granger Cause GDP 42 3.22869 0.03403 **   At 5% significance level,  INV Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause INV 5.00564 0.00542 *   At 1% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause INV
  NS  does not Granger Cause GDP 24 4.8397 0.01297 **   At 5% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause NS 7.25376 0.00242 *   At 1% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause NS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause GDP 26 6.52079 0.00323 *   At 1% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause FS 4.42803 0.01603 **   At 5% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause FS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause INV 24 2.65138 0.08187 ***   At 10% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause NS 4.42531 0.0179 **   At 5% significance level,  INV Granger Cause NS 
  FS  does not Granger Cause INV 26 2.1648 0.12569    FS  does not Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause FS 4.46837 0.0155 **   At 5% significance level,  INV Granger Cause FS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause NS 24 1.93617 0.16207    FS   does not Granger Cause NS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause FS 5.84805 0.00619 *   At 1% significance level,  NS  Granger Cause FS 
NS : National Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
PERU: HP Filtered Series
GDP: GDP per capita growth (annual %, HP filtered)
INV: Gross capital formation (% of GDP, HP filtered)
FS : Foreign Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
 
Note: Significance level: (*) 1%, (**) 5%, (***) 10%. 
 
Table A.26 
PERU: PROBABILITY OF GROWTH TRANSITIONS OCCURRENCE, COUNTRY SPECIFIC 














GDP per capita 28.57% 100.00% 63.16% 71.43% 0.00% 36.84%
Gross Capital Formation 44.44% .. 61.90% 55.56% .. 38.10%
National Savings 100.00% .. 62.50% 0.00% .. 37.50%
Foreign Savings 88.89% .. 100.00% 11.11% .. 0.00%
Period 1960-1989














GDP per capita 0.00% 0.00% Probability 0.00% 0.00% 140.00%
Gross Capital Formation 0.00% .. Probability 0.00% .. 238.46%
National Savings 0.00% .. Probability 0.00% .. 238.46%
Foreign Savings 0.00% .. 0.00% 0.00% .. 0.00%
Period 1960-1989














GDP per capita 22.22% 100.00% 50.00% 77.78% 0.00% 50.00%
Gross Capital Formation 26.67% -- 54.84% 73.33% -- 45.16%
National Savings 81.25% 66.67% 70.00% 18.75% 33.33% 30.00%
Foreign Savings 61.54% -- 56.25% 38.46% -- 43.75%
Period 1960-2006
Country Specific Growth Transitions Common Growth Transitions
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Figure A.10 
VENEZUELA: GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP 
WITH INVESTMENT, NATIONAL AND FOREIGN SAVING RATES 




























































Common Acceleration Common Deceleration
Common Stability Period GDP per capita Growth Rate (HP Filtered)
GDP per capita Average Growth Rate
 





































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
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Figure A.10 (conclusion) 





































































GDP per capita Growth Rate (Annual %, HP Filtered, Left Axis)
National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
 







































































National Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)
Foreign Saving Rate (% of GDP, HP Filtered, Right Axis)  
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
CEPAL - SERIE Macroeconomía del desarrollo N° 58 
75 
Table A.27 





growth      
(annual %)
Gross capital 
formation    
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings       
(% of GDP)
Foreign 
Savings      
(% of GDP)
GDP per 
capita growth  
(annual %)
Gross capital 
formation     
(% of GDP)
National 
Savings      
(% of GDP)
Foreign 
Savings     
(% of GDP)
1960 A
1961 S A S
1962 S A S
1963 S A S
1964 D A A
1965 D A A
1966 D A A
1967 D A A
1968 D A A
1969 D A A
1970 D A A D A A
1971 D A A D A A
1972 A A A D A A
1973 A A A D A A
1974 A A A D A A
1975 A A A A A A
1976 D A D A D A
1977 D A D A D A D
1978 D D D A D D D A
1979 D D D D D D D
1980 D D D D D D D
1981 D D D D D D D D
1982 D D D D D D D D
1983 A D D D D D D
1984 A D D A A D D
1985 A A D A A
1986 A A D A A A
1987 A A D A A
1988 A D D D D
1989 A D A D
1990 A D A D A
1991 A A D A A A A
1992 D A D A A A
1993 D A A A A A
1994 D A A D A
1995 D A A D D A
1996 D A A D D A
1997 D A A A D A A
1998 D A A A D A
1999 D A A D D D
2000 D D A D D D D
2001 D D A D D D A D
2002 A D A D A D A D
2003 A D A D A D A D
2004 A D A D A A D
2005 A A
A Acceleration D Deceleration S Stability
Venezuela:                                      
Accelerations and Decelerations
Venezuela and Latin America & Caribbean: 
Common Accelerations and Decelerations
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
Note: All series have been HP filtered. 
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Table A.28 
VENEZUELA: GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
Series Definitions
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1960 2005
Lags: 3
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability Conclusion
  INV does not Granger Cause GDP 41 2.89437 0.04936 **   At 5% significance level,  INV Granger Cause GDP
  GDP  does not Granger Cause INV 8.41979 0.00025 *   At 1% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause INV
  NS  does not Granger Cause GDP 31 1.02747 0.39803    NS  does not Granger Cause GDP 
  GDP  does not Granger Cause NS 2.36132 0.09654 ***   At 10% significance level,  GDP Granger Cause NS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause GDP 33 2.10252 0.12431    FS   does not Granger Cause GDP 
  GDP  does not Granger Cause FS 1.82398 0.16757    GDP  does not Granger Cause FS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause INV 30 2.08471 0.13006    NS  does not Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause NS 0.45695 0.71498    INV does not Granger Cause NS 
  FS  does not Granger Cause INV 32 10.2883 0.00014 *   At 1% significance level,  FS  Granger Cause INV
  INV does not Granger Cause FS 2.53337 0.07983 ***   At 10% significance level,  INV Granger Cause FS 
  FS   does not Granger Cause NS 31 1.13085 0.35644    FS   does not Granger Cause NS 
  NS  does not Granger Cause FS 0.33758 0.7983    NS  does not Granger Cause FS 
INV: Gross capital formation (% of GDP, HP filtered)
FS : Foreign Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
NS : National Savings (% of GDP, HP filtered)
VENEZUELA: HP Filtered Series
GDP: GDP per capita growth (annual %, HP filtered)
 
Note: Significance level: (*) 1%, (**) 5%, (***) 10%. 
 
Table A.29 
VENEZUELA: PROBABILITY OF GROWTH TRANSITIONS OCCURRENCE, COUNTRY 














GDP per capita 72.73% 0.00% 53.33% 27.27% 100.00% 46.67%
Gross Capital Formation 23.81% .. 22.22% 76.19% .. 77.78%
National Savings 14.29% .. 38.46% 85.71% .. 61.54%
Foreign Savings 87.50% .. 66.67% 12.50% .. 33.33%
Period 1960-1989














GDP per capita 0.00% .. 30.00% 100.00% .. 70.00%
Gross Capital Formation 22.22% .. 33.33% 77.78% .. 66.67%
National Savings 69.23% .. 100.00% 30.77% .. 0.00%
Foreign Savings 0.00% .. 40.00% 100.00% .. 60.00%
Period 1990-2006














GDP per capita 0.00% .. 30.00% 100.00% .. 70.00%
Gross Capital Formation 22.22% .. 33.33% 77.78% .. 66.67%
National Savings 69.23% .. 100.00% 30.77% .. 0.00%
Foreign Savings 0.00% .. 40.00% 100.00% .. 60.00%
Period 1990-2006
Country Specific Growth Transitions Common Growth Transitions
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
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Appendix B 
Description and sources of information 
 
Per capita GDP growth (annual %): Annual percentage growth rate of per capita GDP 
based on constant local currency. Per capita GDP is the gross domestic product divided by the mid-
year population. GDP at purchasers' prices is the sum of the gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value 
of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Source: World Bank national accounts data. 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP): Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic 
investment) consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in 
the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains and so on); 
plant, machinery and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways and the like, 
including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial 
buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected 
fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in progress." According to the 1993 SNA, net 
acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation. Source: World Bank national 
accounts data. 
Foreign saving (% of GDP): Foreign saving consists of the current account balance (% of 
GDP) with negative sign, with that balance being the sum of net exports of goods and services, net 
income and net current transfers. Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Monetary Fund data files and Balance of 
Payments Statistics Yearbook, various years; and World Bank GDP estimates. 
National saving (% of GDP): National saving is the difference between gross capital 
formation and foreign saving (as defined above). Source: Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) estimates on the basis of World Bank national accounts data; OECD 
national accounts data files; and International Monetary Fund data files and Balance of Payments 
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